原文信息： - 标题：Capital Allocators - Timeless Value Investing - 作者：Ted Seides, Seth Klarman - 发表时间：2023-07-17 - 链接：[Capital Allocators](https://www.capitalallocators.com/podcast/timeless-value-investing/) - 中文翻译：ShawnQ（[1](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/4DH1UVVQ8PDM8Py37tQjxA), [2](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/3eufkAv5JKQMmHKB_uCjWA), [3](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/4QrEVNzNKyKOqTmO3IGHNg), [4](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/6hq13pIVugyGXPx0dkjmwg), [5](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/7HdfQsHMRNm8xf6T7BOEkA), [6](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Sc6pimwETjzIRJ3iXA0vRA)） # Episode Description: 单集介绍 Seth Klarman is a legendary value investor and CEO and Portfolio Manager of The Baupost Group, an investment firm founded in 1982 that manages $27 billion. Seth authored the very out-of-print Margin of Safety and edited the recently released 7th edition of Graham and Dodd’s value investing classic, Security Analysis. 塞思·卡拉曼（Seth Klarman）是一位传奇的价值投资者，也是 Baupost 集团的首席执行官兼投资组合经理。Baupost 集团成立于 1982 年，是一家管理着 270 亿美元资产的投资公司。塞思撰写了《安全边际》（Margin of Safety）一书，该书已绝版，他还编辑了最近出版的格雷厄姆和多德的价值投资经典著作《证券分析》（Security Analysis）第 7 版。 Our conversation covers Seth’s early experience in business and investing, path to Baupost, timeless value investing principles and those that have changed over time. We discuss Baupost’s application of value investing across sourcing, diligence, portfolio construction, and risk management. We then turn to Seth’s thoughts illiquidity, international investing, the weird current environment, positioning portfolios for it, alignment with clients, succession at Baupost, and his updated perspectives on Securities Analysis and Margin of Safety. We close discussing Seth’s personal investments in the Boston Red Sox, horse racing, and philanthropy. 我们的谈话涉及塞思早期的商业和投资经历、通往 Baupost 的道路、永恒的价值投资原则以及随着时间推移而改变的原则。我们讨论了 Baupost 在采购、勤勉、投资组合构建和风险管理方面对价值投资的应用。接着，我们讨论了赛斯对流动性不足、国际投资、当前诡异的环境、投资组合的仓位管理、与客户保持一致、Baupost 的继任者以及他对证券分析和安全边际的最新看法。最后，我们讨论了塞思在波士顿红袜队、赛马和慈善事业方面的个人投资。 Seth generally stays away from the public eye, so I was particularly grateful to share this conversation some twenty-five years after we first met. 塞思一般不公开露面，所以在我们初次见面二十五年后，我特别感激能与他分享这次谈话。 --- # Early experience in business and investing 早期的商业和投资经验 **Ted Seides:** Seth, thanks so much for joining me. **泰德·西德斯**：塞思，非常感谢你能来参加我的节目。 **Seth Klarman:** It's great to be with you. Thanks so much for having me. **塞思·卡拉曼**：很高兴来参加节目，非常感谢你邀请我。 **Ted Seides:** I'd love to go all the way back to your first memories of your interest in business and investing. **泰德·西德斯**：我想先请你谈谈，你最初是如何对商业和投资产生兴趣的？ **Seth Klarman:** Well, it goes way back to childhood, maybe even early childhood, I was always starting small businesses. I was a micro entrepreneur in the sense of doing leaf raking and lawn mowing. I had a snow cone stand and got in trouble with the Baltimore health authorities when we added hot dogs. So that's no cone stand cuz we didn't have a license. And I was having little carnivals in our yard for kids and built the mini golf course in my yard, although my mom didn't really appreciate that. I had a tiny interest in collecting coins and used to buy and sell some coins by mails, a mini activity as well. So I was just doing a lot, mostly just getting my feet wet and learning a lot. **塞思·卡拉曼**：这要追溯到童年，甚至幼年的时候。那时我总做些“小生意”，是个“微型创业家”，做过打扫落叶和修剪草坪的工作。我9岁时摆过一个甜筒摊位，但当我开始售卖热狗时，惹上了巴尔的摩卫生局，因为我们没有执照。我在院子里为孩子们举办小型嘉年华，还在院子里建了一个迷你高尔夫球场，不过我妈妈不太喜欢。我对收集硬币有一点小兴趣，曾通过邮寄买卖一些硬币，这也是门迷你生意。可见，为了摸索和学习，我做了很多事情。 My main interest was in the stock market. I was a numbers guy. I love the baseball statistics. I was always turning the Baltimore Sun Papers to the sports section. They would have every batter and every pitcher in the American League and all their stats and I was learning how to calculate those statistics as well. 但我主要的兴趣还是股票市场。我是个对数字很敏感的人，喜欢看棒球统计数据。我经常翻阅《巴尔的摩太阳报》的体育版，上面会刊登美国联盟中每个击球手、投手的数据，我也在学习如何计算这些数据。 And at some point, I noticed there were a whole bunch of numbers a few pages after the baseball statistics. And I asked my dad what those were and found out those were the stock exchange listings. And so it just began another journey of trying to connect my interest to figure out what was going on and what was that all about. I read a bunch about the market. I remember reading a book about how I made $1 million in the stock market. I remember reading how to buy stocks by Lewis Engel. So kind of up and down the spectrum of what was out there. 直到有一次，我留意到棒球版面的后面几页布满了一大堆数字，我问父亲那是什么，结果发现是证券交易所的股票名单。于是，我开启了另一段旅程，试图把我的兴趣与之联系起来，弄清市场到底在发生什么，股市是怎么一回事。我读了很多关于市场的资料。我记得我读过一本关于如何在股市中赚到100万美元的书，我还读了路易斯·恩格尔（Lewis Ingle）写的《如何购买股票》，可以说市面上有的读物我都翻翻。 **Ted Seides:** How old were you when you buy your first stock? **泰德·西德斯**：你是几岁买的第一只股票？ **Seth Klarman:** I bought a share of Johnson & Johnson when I was around 10 years old with money I got from my birthday. A few days later, it split 3 for 1, which I didn't know had been announced. It must have been announced a little bit before that. So I own 3 shares of Johnson and Johnson. Why did I buy it? I knew what the company did, and you gotta start somewhere. My mom found me a very kind stockbroker named Max Silverman down in Baltimore, and he was happy to execute an order where he couldn't possibly make any money. And he was my stockbroker for a number of years, but it was always at a very small scale. **塞思·卡拉曼**：10岁左右时，我用生日攒的零花钱买了一股强生公司的股票。几天后，强生公司一拆三，这一消息想必在我买之前就已经宣布了，但我并不知情，所以我拥有了三股强生公司的股票。我为什么买强生的股票呢？原因在于我了解这家公司是做啥的，你总得从自己知道的领域开始吧。我妈妈在巴尔的摩给我找了个非常好的股票经纪人，叫麦克斯·西尔弗曼，他很乐意接一笔自己压根儿不赚钱的订单。他做了我好几年的股票经纪人，但交易规模一直很小。 **Ted Seides:** Where did that take you as you got older, you know, went through college? **泰德·西德斯**：随着你年纪增长和在大学的学习，后来的人生轨迹是怎样的？ **Seth Klarman:** So I was really fortunate. **塞思·卡拉曼**：我真的很幸运。 My Uncle Paul, my mother's brother, lived in New York, and he was a tax attorney and an old friend of Max Heine, who was the founder/head of Mutual Shares. My uncle introduced me to Max when I was junior in college and I got a job for the summer and then ultimately an offer to come back full time when I graduated, which was in January of 79. So that's how I got to mutual shares in my history there. 我舅舅保罗住在纽约，是一名税务律师，也是麦克斯·海因（Max Heine）的老朋友，麦克斯·海因是Mutual Shares的创始人。大三时，舅舅把我引荐给了麦克斯，那年暑假我开始在Mutual Share实习，并在79年1月毕业后获得了全职工作的机会。这就是我与Mutual Shares的渊源。 I continued to hold stocks, trade stocks and read, but the key was getting that job. It was a value investing mutual fund, Mike Price had started by then and was Max's protege and running a lot of the activities day to day. It was like being led in on a secret that you could read about it all you want, but when you actually start doing analysis and you see individual companies trade at a discount from what they're pretty obviously worse. It's easy to get excited that there's some inefficiency here, and you have a chance to really add value and do well. 此后，我继续持有股票、交易股票并且勤读不辍，但关键还是得到了那份工作。迈克尔·普莱斯（Mike Price）当时启动了一只价值投资共同基金，他是麦克斯的门徒，已经做得有起色了，每天管理着许多日常事务。（Michael Price于1976年成为Mutual Fund基金经理，当时基金管理资产只有500万美元，至1996年为止，他所管理的4只基金资产达130亿美元，20年成长了2600倍，基金在20年间平均年达20%，比同时期S&P500指数高出5个百分点）这就好似被告知了一个秘密，你可以随心所欲地去了解它。但当你真正着手分析时，当你看到个别公司的交易价明显低于其实际价值时，你很容易就为市场存在一些低效而感到兴奋。你有机会真正提供价值并且做得不错。 **Ted Seides:** What was your first 'Aha' moment from having picked a bunch of stocks yourself to now working and seeing a philosophy behind it? **泰德·西德斯**：从自己挑选一堆股票，到后来工作并看到了其背后的理念，你的第一个顿悟时刻是什么？ **Seth Klarman:** The most clear thing was that picking stocks yourself, you knew what the companies did. I knew that Johnson & Johnson made bandages, which I apparently was an extensive user of when I was a small kid. **塞思·卡拉曼**：最明确的一点是，你要自己挑选股票，并且你要知道那些公司都在做什么。我知道强生公司生产创可贴，当我少不更事时，我显然是其重度用户。 But I didn't really know how to connect that to anything tangible about why would I pay a particular price or what would make that stock go up or down. So being in the business and watching every day and seeing some of the peripheral things, like you can't just assume that just because the stock trades at a price or a bond trades at a price that you can actually buy any there, because it's a market, and maybe you can buy it and maybe it's not that liquid or maybe by the time you get around to deciding what you wanna buy, it's moved a lot. So there were just a lot of nuts and bolts that all went into the entire equation. 但我真不知道该如何将任何有形的东西与股价联系起来，比如我为什么要支付特定的价格？或者是什么因素让那只股票涨或跌？因此，进入这个行业后，我每天都在观察，留意到一些次要的东西，比如你不能仅仅因为股票以这个价格交易或债券以这个价格交易，就认为你可以在那买到任何股票。因为这是一个市场，也许你买得到，也许它流动性不是那么好，或是当你决定要买什么的时候，它的价格已经变了很多。因此，有很多细节会影响到整个等式。 Mutual Shares was a great place to sit because Max Heine had in his office this old railroad bond trader, Hans Jacobson. You hear all these names that they're bidding various prices, and you really have no idea what lies behind that. But eventually, it became clear that a number of them were US railroad bankruptcies, several connected to the Penn Central bankruptcy, which was unfolding around that time and which led to the creation of a bunch of other securities. It turns out, of course, that railroads had been granted building rights over the tracks and that they had all kinds of real estate value in addition to any value they might have as a railroad. And so there were just a series of securities that went from obscurity, because you'd never even heard of them, into mainstream, at least for somebody sitting at Mutual Shares, because they started to make sense and you understood why the price is fluctuated and why they might be really attractive as an investment. 光是坐在Mutual Shares就很好，因为麦克斯·海因的办公室里有一位老铁路债券交易员汉斯·雅各布森（Hans Jacobsen），你会听到各种公司名，它们以不同的价格进行交易，当时你真不知道这背后隐藏着什么。但最终，情况愈发明显，其中一些是美国铁路公司的破产案，有几起与宾夕法尼亚州中央铁路公司的破产案有关，该案当时正在进行中，并导致了一系列其他证券的诞生。事实证明，铁路公司已经获得了轨道上的建筑权，并且除了铁路本身可能具有的价值外，它们还拥有各种房地产价值。就这样，一系列证券从闻所未闻变为了主流（至少对Mutual Shares来说如此），因为现在它们开始变得合理，你明白了价格为什么会波动，以及为什么它们作为投资标的可能非常有吸引力。 I also remember the first stock, I believe Michael Price threw a prospectus on my desk and said, "Here, figure this out", which was a typical Michael Price instruction to me. 我也记得分析第一只股票的时候。当时迈克尔·普莱斯把一份招股说明书扔到我桌子上，说 “来，把这个搞清楚。”这是迈克尔·普莱斯给我下的惯用指示。 A company called Telecor, which was an electronics distributor, was losing their contract with the Japanese company whose products they were distributing, and they were gonna get bought out for the value of net working capital or something like that. 这家公司叫Telecor，是家电子产品分销商，当时正丢掉和一家日本公司的合同，而Telecor分销的正是这家日本公司的产品。Telecor打算以净营运资本的价值或类似的价格被收购。 Telecor also owned a subsidiary called Electro Rent, which rented and leased the same kind of electronic equipment. So you were gonna get $8 or so in cash over a period of time, but not that long. And you were going to receive share of Electro Rent, a fraction of a share of Electro Rent. And Electro Rent that valuation that you could created for was trading at under 1 times earnings. Telecor还拥有一家名为“Electro Rent”的子公司，专门出租同类电子设备。在Telecor被收购的过程中，其股东将在一定时间内（时间不会太久）获得8美元左右的现金，还会获得Electro Rent一定比例的股票。而以这种方式所获得的Electro Rent股票，其隐含估值连1倍市盈率都不到。 And that was math I could do in my head and math that made the nature of that inefficiency seemed so glaring and so obvious, and probably was a great example for me of complexity can be an investor's friend, that if a person wanted to buy Electro Rent previously, they couldn't. The only way to get it was this way. That most of the time you wouldn't wanna pay \$8 in change to create a share of something that is only worth cents, in that most of the money you were just gonna get back from the liquidation payment end of the licensing deal with Telecor. 这是我在脑子里就能进行的数学运算，它让市场的低效显得如此耀眼和明显。对我来说，这是个很好的例子，说明复杂性可以成为投资者的朋友。如果一个人之前想买Electro Rent，他们是买不到的。唯一的办法就是以这种方式买。多数情况下，你不会想为了一个每股值几角钱的子公司而花8块钱买下整个公司，你之所以这样做是因为你能从Telecor合同结束后的清算付款中拿回大部分本金。 Nevertheless, it was a great lesson that there are arbitrage opportunities, that the complexity leads sometimes to opportunity that you need to really soak yourself in the details. That opportunity may not immediately be apparent. It certainly wouldn't be apparent from reading a financial report from last year cuz that's not an ongoing concern, but rather understanding how the pieces all come together using your own ideational thinking to understand what might get in the way. Is there an approval needed or are some payments owed to somebody that you've got to subtract before you think about your proceeds, or are there taxes due on the transaction? It was really a broadening example of the kind of things an arbitrage investor needs to think about, compare to an investor in a going concern. 这是很好的一课，即市场存在套利机会，复杂性有时会带来投资机会。你需要真正沉下心去关注各种细节，隐藏的机会才会显现出来，（在Telecor的案例中），光读公司去年的财报当然看不出机会，因为这已经不是一个可以持续经营下去的公司了。相反，你需要主动构思，了解各种碎片化信息是如何组合在一起的，从而明白哪些因素可能成为交易的阻碍。是否需要某种审批？是否有某些欠款，需要在计算收益前扣除？又或者公司是否需要为这笔交易缴纳税款？这确实是个拓宽眼界的案例，与持续经营企业的投资者相比，套利投资者需要考虑的事情更加纷繁复杂。 **Ted Seides:** So as you're learning early on in your career, it's also around the same time you had the Bill Sharps of the world writing about efficient markets hypothesis. And I'm really curious as you started hearing about that, thinking about the markets and index fund investing and then on the other side, you're seeing all these security level inefficiencies. How did you think about the investing world more broadly? **泰德·西德斯**：在你早期的职业生涯学习阶段，正好也是比尔·夏普那些人撰写有效市场假说等理论的时期。我很好奇当你开始听到这些说法，思考市场和指数基金投资，同时又看到大量股票低于公允价值，显示市场似乎是低效的时候，你是如何更广泛地理解投资世界的？ **Seth Klarman:** I read a book after that, but quite a while ago called "To Conquer the Air". And it's about Orville and Wilbur. Right? And they're building a flying machine in the early 1900s. At the same time as they were trying to build an airplane, you had a guy named Langley at Smithsonian also trying to build a flying machine. And he was the respected guy. He was a academic and famous and everybody thought he would succeed. And it all made sense in theory. But the Wright brothers went down to Kitty Hawk, where the winds were strong and where they could experiment with what the winds might do to any particular kind of flying craft and how the wings of a airplane might be the same or different from the wings of a bird and how you might maneuver in the air. Langley's machine eventually was launched, I believe, off of a river, and it was all set to launch out over the water and fly. Accepted plopped in the water, never to be seen again. And the Wright brothers over a couple of summers, figured it out. **塞思·卡拉曼**：此后我读了一本书，那是很久以前的事了，书名叫《征服天空》，讲的是莱特兄弟在20世纪初制造飞行器的故事。在他们尝试建造飞机的同时，史密森公司有一个叫兰利的人也在尝试制造飞行器。他是个受人尊敬的学者，名气很大，每个人都认为他会成功，从理论上讲，一切合情合理。但莱特兄弟去了风力强劲的基蒂霍克，在那里他们可以试验风力对特定类型的飞行器的影响，以及飞机的机翼和鸟的翅膀之间有什么不同。相比之下，兰利的飞行器在一条河上发射，一切都为了从水面上发射和飞行而设置，但它最终却掉进水里，再也见不到了。几个夏天之后，莱特兄弟发明了飞机。 And I say that because it seems to me it's the same thing that I always thought. There are these academics, sitting in their institutions, writing out theories, and in theory, it makes sense. I might be Yogi Berra who said, in theory, every theory works, but in practice, a lot of them don't. 我这么说是因为在我看来这是一码事。我总觉得有些学者坐在自己的机构里写理论，从理论上讲，很多事情都有道理。约吉·贝拉（Yogi Berra，前美国职棒大联盟的捕手、教练与球队经理）好像说过，“理论上，每一个理论都是可行的。”但在实践中，很多理论并不可行。 The academic idea was logical that there are transaction costs and there are a lot of competitors. And even when there aren't that many, even one competitor can reprice and miss pricing. But had they chosen instead to sit down at the trading desk of Mutual Shares, they might have seen what really inefficient markets look like and realized that what's true in theory isn't true in practice in every case. 学术界的想法合乎逻辑，即（市场）存在交易成本，有很多参与者（competitors），即使没那么多参与者，一个交易对手也能重新定价。但要是他们坐在Mutual Shares的交易台前，他们可能就会看到真正低效的市场长什么样，然后意识到，**理论上正确的东西，在实践中并不总是对的。** The first book that I read about the efficient market, it was Malcol, and it was about the random walk on Wall Street. I appreciated what he was trying to say, but I also knew that was just silliness. And what's interesting is it was true in the same way that they mused in that book. You could try to imagine what it would be like to ride a horse by sitting on the fence and observing a bunch of horses in the field. Or you can go get on a horse. I think it's as simple as that. You need to be creative. You need to be curious, need to be not afraid to fail, willing to think outside the box, and maybe you'll come up with something. 我读到的第一本关于有效市场的书是马尔科姆的《华尔街漫步》。我很欣赏他想表达的意思，但我也知道那玩意儿是愚蠢的。有意思的是，就像那本书中说的，你可以坐在围栏上观察场里的马，试着想象骑马的感觉，或者你也可以上马骑骑看。我觉得就是这么简单。你需要有创造力，你需要有好奇心，你需要不怕失败，愿意跳出条条框框去思考，这样你也许就会有所发现。 **Ted Seides:** As you're learning at Mutual Shares back in the day, how did you make the decision to go to business school? **泰德·西德斯**：当你在Mutual shares学习时，是如何做出了去商学院进修的决定？ **Seth Klarman:** It was actually really tough. I enjoyed Mutual Shares immensely. I loved sitting side by side. I was literally next to Mike Price and right around the corner of the trading desk for Max Heine. And I was the only analyst. It was literally the three of us met a bunch of traders, and met people. It was such a wonderful learning experience, and I was soaking it in. **塞思·卡拉曼**：事实上，这真的很难。我非常喜欢Mutual Share，我就坐在迈克普莱斯（Mike Price）旁边，就在麦克斯·海因（Max Heine）交易台的拐角处。我是唯一的分析师，就只有我们三个人和一群交易员和行政人员。这是一次美妙的学习经历，我沉浸其中。 On the other hand, I had a sense that top business school would be a good place to go. It would round me out. I may have known more and more about stocks, but I didn't know a lot about business. And so to study business to try to understand what's a good company, what makes a company great, how to think about running a company. And besides, the challenges was certainly appealing. And I ultimately thought it's not gonna be negative, it's probably gonna have a lot of positive. And it will make me better investor if I decide to stick to investing. I also wanted to rule out that there was something else I'd rather do, although I kind of suspected that investing was my thing. So I did investing before, took a summer job at Salomon Brothers just to see what investment banking was. It was very popular back then, and a lot of people were going in that direction. And I didn't think I'd love it, but I figured I'd try it and actually had a great experience and I enjoyed the young people at Solomon Brothers and met some of the partners who stayed in touch over the years, but I realized that investing was where my heart was. So as soon as I graduated, I had an offer to go back to Mutual Shares. But serendipitously had an opportunity to come in at the ground floor of Baupost being formed, and that's what I chose. 但另一方面，我有一种感觉，即顶级商学院会是一个好去处，它能让我变得更全面。我对股票的了解或许越来越多，但对商业却知之甚少。因此，学习商业，试图了解什么是好公司，是什么造就了一家伟大的公司，如何思考和应对公司经营中的挑战，这些无疑都很吸引我。归根结底，**我认为这一决定不会有什么负面影响，大概率会有很多积极作用**。如果毕业后我仍然决定坚守投资领域，它将使我成为更好的投资者。另外，虽然我感觉投资就是我的兴趣所在，但也想排除万一还有更愿意做的其他事。所以，此前我做过投资，我又在所罗门兄弟公司（Solomon Brothers）找了份暑期工，只是想看看投资银行到底是干啥的。那时候投资银行很流行，很多人都想往那个方向发展，我不觉得我会喜欢，但我还是想试试看，结果体验很不错。我很喜欢所罗门公司的年轻人，也结识了一些至今仍有联系的合伙人，但我意识到投资才是我心之所向。因此，我一毕业，就收到了回Mutual Shares工作的邀约，但偶然的机会让我来到了正在成立的Baupost公司。这就是我的选择。 # Path to Baupost 通往 Baupost 之路 **Ted Seides:** How did that come about? **泰德·西德斯**：这是怎么一回事？ **Seth Klarman:** I had a professor of real estate, and I took his course. At some point, he called me in to talk about a test I'd done in my exam. But what really had happened was he and some friends had a stake in Channel 5 in Boston. Channel 5 at the time was being sold to Metro Media for a pretty fancy price that may be the highest price for a TV station up to that point. And he had decided that he'd wanna join with a few other friends, some from the TV station, one not from that background, and create an expanded family office. This was the early 80s, so it was an era of bank failures and rapidly rising interest rates and inflation. And in some ways, a general distrust of the financial system and where should you put your money in, how could you make sure the taxes got paid and the coupons got clipped and all of that. **塞思·卡拉曼**：我有一位教房地产的教授，我修了他的课。有一次，他把我叫去，说起我考试时做过的一个测试，但他真正想说的是，他和一些朋友持有波士顿第5频道（Channel 5）的股份。当时第5频道正被出售给大都会传媒公司（Metro Media），出价相当贵，也许是当时电视台领域的最高价了。于是他决定和其他几个朋友一起（有些来自电视台，有的没有电视台背景），成立一个扩大的家族办公室。要知道那是上世纪80年代初期，是一个银行倒闭、利率飙升、通胀高企的时代。某种程度上，人们对金融体系普遍不信任，不知道该把钱放哪，想的都是如何确保税款已缴纳，息票已经兑现等问题。 So at the exact same time that I was graduating, this plan was in motion. Baupost would have been formed with me or without me, but my coming along maybe changed the trajectory and they realized the original plan was to hand out the capital to smart money managers. And in the earliest days of Baupost when I joined after I graduated in May of 82, I went to New York a bunch and met with money managers and thought about: "Well, would this one be good to hire? Would that would be good to hire? What's the playing field look like?" It revealed a lot, but it also ultimately led to the decision that we would actually be better off managing the money ourselves. 在我毕业时，这个计划已经开始启动了，所以有我没我，Baupost公司都会成立，但我的到来或许改变了公司的发展轨迹。他们最初的计划是把资金交给聪明的基金经理来管。我在82年5月毕业后加入了Baupost，当时公司刚成立不久，我去纽约面见了很多基金经理，边见边想：“聘这个人怎么样？聘那个人会好吗？他们处在怎样的竞争环境？” 这揭示出了许多问题，也最终导致了我们最好还是自己管理资金的决定。 **Ted Seides:** What did it reveal? **泰德·西德斯**：揭示了什么？ **Seth Klarman:** Among other things, it revealed a great deal of group thinking. Everybody's favorite stocks were the same stocks. Everybody was buying Warner Brothers back then because they owned Atari. There was a lot of excitement around video games, as there has been excitement every few years about something different in the market. And then shockingly to me, how few of the managers of money actually put their own money in the same product that they were expecting their clients to be in and how important that alignment is. It's one of the main reasons Baupost didn't invest with any of those managers. We’d realized that people talked a good game, but they didn't put their money where their mouth is, and why eating home cooking is such a foundational principle of Baupost. We're still today, the employees and their families are by far the largest client on a collective basis. **塞思·卡拉曼**：别的不说，它揭示了大量的群体思维。每个人最喜欢的股票都是同一只，当年是华纳兄弟，因为他们拥有雅达利游戏公司。就像每隔几年市场上就会出现一些不同的热点一样，当时人们对电子游戏感到亢奋。然后，让我震惊的是，很少有资金管理者真正把自己的钱投到他们希望客户参与的同一产品中，而这种利益一致性是多么重要阿。这也是Baupost没有投资那些基金经理中的任何一个的主要原因。我们意识到，这些人嘴上说得头头是道，却不用自己的真金白银跟投，这也是为什么“自家做菜自家吃”是Baupost如此根本的一项原则，直到今天，公司员工和他们的家人合起来，仍然是Baupost最大的客户。 # Value investing principles over time 价值投资原则历久弥新 **Ted Seides:** When you went to launch Baupost, you were instilled in the early years in what was called and probably still is value investing. We'd love to hear how you define value investing? **泰德·西德斯**：在创办Baupost的时候，你已被灌输了所谓价值投资的理念，也许现在仍然如此。我想听听你是如何定义价值投资的？ **Seth Klarman:** The key definition for value investing comes from Graham and Dodd, and the idea of it is that because markets are inefficient, prices deviate from value. And that deviation sometimes they fall below underlying value, and that makes them a value investment, it makes them attractive. Other times, they get to full value and maybe even significantly exceed it, at which point you should have sold. And if you were inclined to be a short seller, perhaps shorted it. **塞思·卡拉曼**：价值投资的基本定义来自格雷厄姆和多德。它的想法是，由于市场是低效的，价格将偏离价值。有时，价格低于内在价值，此时投资将物超所值，使之成为价值投资；另一些时候，股价可能被炒得过头，甚至大大超出内在价值，此时你就应该卖出，如果你倾向于做空，也许可以做空。 The principles made sense. I was probably too literal in my earliest understanding of Graham and Dodd, which I'm sure I read The Intelligent Investor first, being the more accessible of the two books. Security Analysis came later. But I think what I was applying was not Graham and Dodd value investing, but Mutual Shares value investing. So, I was already looking at special situations, looking at broadly across the landscape to equities, but also to arbitrages and to credit and in the case of these lower bonds — distress credit. 这些原则是有道理的。在我职业生涯最初期，我对格雷厄姆和多德的理解或许太局限于字面意义，我先读了《聪明的投资者》，因为这是他两本书中更通俗易懂的，《证券分析》是后来读的。但我认为我实践的并非格雷厄姆和多德的价值投资法，而是Mutual Share的价值投资法。当时，我已经在寻找特殊情况（指公司收购合并、分拆、退市等特殊事件所带来的投资机会），我关注更广泛的资本市场，不仅仅是股票，同时也关注套利和信贷领域，具体到低估的债券方面，我主要看不良信贷（Distress Credit）。 So, I think it gave me a good analytical grasp rather than being pigeonholed into one single asset class, to understand that investors can look broadly across the landscape. And if you can figure out a stock, for example, why can't you figure out the value of the entire private business? If you can understand a bond, why can't you understand a bank loan or convertible bond, or a municipal bond for that matter, perhaps one backed by a piece of real estate? There was just a lot of learning there that the broad scope was attractive and perhaps also valuable for an investor, because the ability to move capital into whatever was attractive. Maybe sometimes stocks were high but bonds were low, or sometimes stocks and bonds were both high but real estate was low. That was also a piece of the thinking. 因此，我认为这让我掌握了很好的分析能力，而不是被局限在单一的资产类别中，懂得了投资者可以纵观全局。比方说，如果你能弄清楚一只股票，为什么不能弄清楚一家私人企业的整体价值？如果你能理解债券，为什么不能理解银行贷款、可转换债券或市政债券呢？或一只以房地产做担保的债券？这里面有大量的门道可以学习。对投资者来说，拓宽投资视野不仅诱人，也可能价值连城，因为这样你就能将资本配置到最具吸引力的地方。（例如），有时候股票价格高，而债券价格低；有时则股债价格都高，而房地产价格低。这也是一种思路。 **Ted Seides:** One aspect of what you originally read of Graham and Dodd, did you stick too closely to? **泰德·西德斯**：最初读到格雷厄姆和多德的文章，是否有哪方面是你过分拘泥于其中的？ **Seth Klarman:** I was too enamored of book value. When you think about book value, you need to go back to the founding principles era in which Gram and Dodd were writing. So, Security Analysis came out in 1934, first edition. **塞思·卡拉曼**：我太迷恋账面价值了。当你考虑账面价值时，你需要回到格雷厄姆和多德撰写第一版《证券分析》，并提出价值投资基本原则的那个时代，即1934年。 There's description among other things of the super investors article that Warren Buffett wrote in the Columbia Business School magazine in the early 60s. And the super investors article looked at several investors, all of whom were familiar to Buffett and how they'd all had exceptional performance. 沃伦·巴菲特60年代初，在哥伦比亚商学院杂志上发表了一篇名为《超级投资者》的文章。这篇文章介绍了巴菲特熟悉的几位投资者，以及他们是如何取得非凡业绩的。 Now, I'm not sure this was a perfect scientific test because not all of them maybe had previously been identified. Nevertheless, they followed general value principles in their investing and they followed them very differently. One followed bigger cap companies and another followed smaller cap companies, and one was global, not just the United States. And so, you saw at least the idea that this approach might apply in a variety of places. 我不确定这是否是一个完美的科学测试，因为并非所有人都能在事前就被识别出来。然而，他们都在投资中遵循了一般性价值原则，虽然遵循的方式各不相同，有人关注的是大市值公司，有人投资小市值公司，还有人进行全球投资，而不仅限于美国。因此，你至少看到了这种方法可能适用于各种地方。 And then Buffett also in that article makes the observation that value investing is something not everybody is comfortable with, but that it's like an inoculation. When you get introduced to the approach, either it makes sense and you get it, or you don't. And I felt like that inoculation had taken with me. That it made complete sense that people have trouble being patient and holding out for their best opportunities to show up, and not just plunging in. 巴菲特在那篇文章中还指出，价值投资并非人人都能接受，这就像接种疫苗一样。当你被介绍到这种投资方法时，要么觉得有道理，要么排斥。我觉得我已接种了这种疫苗。人们难以保持耐心，等待最佳投资机会的出现，总是在没有充分准备的情况下一头扎进去，这完全可以理解。 Bill Ackman once said to me that value investing in a classic sense is like watching paint dry, but I bring a hair blower. I thought, well, that's a good definition of activism. And certainly I'm not one to just want to own stocks forever and sit on them forever. There are times when it actually can be challenging. 比尔·阿克曼（Bill Ackman）曾对我说，传统意义上的价值投资就像看着油漆变干，而我带了个吹风机。我想，这是对股东激进主义（Activism，也可译为股东积极主义，指投资者利用投票、提案或者诉讼等方式主动参与上市公司决策，影响其创造价值过程，从而提升公司市值，获得投资收益）的一个很好定义。当然，我也不是那种永久持有某只股票，然后坐等股票上涨的人。有时，这样做可能充满挑战。 In effect, the hard thing about investing in general is: the market tells you you're wrong all the time, that the very reason that you can find a mispricing, the very reason that you can find a market inefficiency, that causes the stock to go to a discount, might well still apply after you own it and it might go to a bigger discount. And that's not lost on Graham and Dodd, that's right there in security analysis. But the idea of that is, perhaps there are ways you can speed it up, maybe you can apply Bill Ackman's hair dryer into the process. 实际上，投资的难点就在于：市场总是告诉你，「你错了」。那些让你能发现错误定价和市场低效的因素，以及导致股票折价的因素，很可能在你买入后仍然适用，甚至可能让它跌得更惨。格雷厄姆和多德没有忽略这一点，《证券分析》中也有所涉及。我想说的是，也许有一些办法可以加快（价值回归的）进程，也许你可以将比尔·阿克曼“吹风机”的概念应用到这一过程中。 One of the things that Baupost has done over the years is we follow the basic principles, we're looking for bargains, we're patient, we're disciplined, we're willing to say no a lot. As Warren Buffett says, we're not afraid to just leave the bat on our shoulder and not swing. But at times, you do swing and then you've got to be comfortable with some of the important elements of value investing, you gotta be comfortable that a bargain can become an even bigger bargain. 多年来，Baupost所做的一件事就是遵循基本原则：我们寻找便宜货，我们保持耐心，我们遵守纪律，我们愿意经常说“不”，正如沃伦·巴菲特所说的那样，我们不怕把球棒放在肩上而不挥动。但有时，你会挥杆，这时你必须对价值投资的一些重要元素感到心安，你必须坦然接受便宜的股票可能变得更便宜。 And this is what resonated with me maybe the most. If you look to the market for feedback, the market might regularly say: "you're an idiot, you bought it, now it's down, you don't know what you're doing." But the reality is, you've got to see that a little bit differently. You've got to see that as the market is now offering you a better bargain. Either you have confidence in yourself, or you believe in the market as giving you valuable information. 这也许是我最有共鸣的一点：如果你寻求市场的反馈，市场可能会经常告诉你：“你这个白痴，你买错了，它跌了，你根本不知道你在做什么。”但现实是，你必须换个角度看待这一切，你必须将其视为市场现在为你提供了更好的价格。要么你对自己（的判断）保持信心，要么你相信市场给了你有价值的信息。 And then as Graham and Buffett say, if you look to the market for the answers, you're going to just be following popular opinion. But if you look to the market as a manic counterparty that sometimes sells you something at a big discount from what it's worth and other times pays you more than it's worth, now you're talking, now you're going to be able to take advantage of the erratic market to profit as an investor. 正如格雷厄姆和巴菲特所说，如果你向市场寻求答案，你只会追随大众的观点。但是，如果你把市场看作一个狂躁的交易对手，有时以比价值低得多的价格卖给你一些东西，有时则让你付高于其价值的价格，那你就在点子上了，那你就能利用反复无常的市场来获利。 **Ted Seides:** A lot of businesses you could buy, (I mean) in the form of stock, or assets you can buy, they're not static values. Things change over time. And I'd love to hear a bit about from those early lessons of Graham and Dodd, how you've thought about adapting the way you apply valuation to businesses and assets? **泰德·西德斯**：你可以以股票或资产的形式购买许多企业，而它们的价值不是一成不变的。随着时间的推移，情况会发生变化，我想听听你是如何从格雷厄姆和多德的早期经验，调整你对企业和资产的评估方式的？ **Seth Klarman:** Graham and Dodd lived in a world where, I believe, there was considerably less technological innovation. There wasn't none. Over that period of time, we invented radio and refrigeration and air conditioning eventually, and automobiles decades before. But a lot of innovation…But there was no Venture Capital industry. These innovations often took a while to take hold, the rollout was slow. It wasn't like downloading software at a click with no cost of goods sold. **塞思·卡拉曼**：我相信，格雷厄姆和多德生活在一个技术创新少得多的世界里。并不是说完全没有。那段时间，我们发明了收音机、冰箱和空调，还发明了汽车，很多创新…但那时没有风险投资行业，那些创新往往需要一段时间才能站稳脚跟，推广速度缓慢，不像下载软件那样可以一键搞定，还没有销售成本。 When the economy suffered, when a stock became mispriced in the 1930s, it was almost certainly because we were in a depression, and that there was a cyclical downturn. Gram and Dodd knew that. They wrote about it, which I give them huge amount of credit for, and they wrote that it would not be reasonable to assume that depression will always be the circumstance, and yet they couldn't know when it would end or if it would get worse before it got better. 20世纪30年代，当经济遭受重创、股票被错误定价时，几乎可以肯定是因为我们身处经济萧条之中，出现了周期性衰退。格雷厄姆和多德认识到了这点，他们在书中写道，假设萧条将一直持续是不合理的。然而，他们不知道经济萧条何时结束，或者情况是否会在好转前变得更糟。 That also, by the way, resonates with me because I think the idea of financial writing, you can write a newsletter, I suppose, and try to be right for the next two weeks. Or you can try to write something down and say to yourself. What is the essence of this? That's going to matter not just months from now but years and decades and maybe even a century from now. Just as Graham and Dodd are applicable 89 years after it was written in 1934. What might we say about what we're writing today that will still be applicable in 89 years? So I at least think that length is really important. 顺带一提，在写作财经内容方面，这也引起了我的强烈共鸣。你可以写一篇 newsletter（原是一种邮件营销方式，近几年海外许多个人性质的博主和独立创作者用 newsletter 创作内容并通过付费订阅获得稳定收入，类似于国内的公众号），尝试在未来两周内毫无破绽，或者你也可以试着写一些东西，然后扪心自问，让这些内容未来仍然重要的要素是什么，不仅是几个月，而是在几年、几十年，甚至一个世纪后是否依然适用，正如《证券分析》自1934年问世后的89年来仍然适用。我们今天要写出什么样的内容能在89年内都适用？我认为时间跨度非常重要。 And that, to me, is what gives that book historical significance that nobody's saying follow their exact formula or go page by page and you'll know what to do. The companies are all gone. They've been merged or liquidated decades ago, out of existence. Many of the principles that they talk about are based on laws at the time around prudent man rule or other regulations that no longer apply. 对我来说，这正是这本书的历史意义。没人会说，遵循他们的确切公式或一页页地照做，你就知道该怎么做投资。（他们谈论的）那些公司早已消失，不是合并就是被清算，他们谈论的许多原则都是基于当时的法律，如“谨慎人规则”或其他一些已不再适用的法规。 But what's still applicable is that despite all the changes, the general principles which are essentially dependent on humans and their psychological tendencies to get overly exuberant and to get overly depressed, and to have constraints on the humans. "You must buy a highly rated bond, you can only own a stock that pays a dividend, you cannot own a stock below a certain market cap, or below a certain share price…" And those kinds of rules and constraints can lead to inefficiencies. 尽管投资环境发生了许多变化，但一般性原则仍然适用，这些原则依赖于人们时而狂热、时而颓唐的心理倾向，以及人为施加的种种约束，（例如）你必须买高评级债券；你只能买要分红的股票；你不能买低于特定市值或特定股价的股票…这些规则和约束将引发市场的低效。 And so, while the nature of the exact inefficiencies may have changed a lot in 89 years, the certainty that there will be those, I think, remains high. And I am actually pretty optimistic that they will remain even if computers are replacing people as money managers and we're doing all the trading. And that's because the nature of what causes the inefficiency, it's human. But I think the computers will mimic what the humans would do, because that's what they're trained to do. And so, I think that even AI wouldn't make the markets fully efficient. 因此，尽管低效的具体表现在89年中发生了很大变化，但我认为，它继续存在的概率仍然很高。事实上，我非常乐观地认为，即使电脑取代人类成为资金管理人，低效市场仍会存在。因为导致（市场）低效的本质是人，电脑被训练去模仿人类的所作所为。因此，我认为就算AI也不会使市场完全有效。 **Ted Seides:** There is a degree to which AI, as you get closer to general intelligence, tries to replicate how humans would think. Where do you think, as computers on the short end, say, of trading, and then AI, maybe over time replicating thinking, will still go wrong relative to human behavior? **泰德·西德斯**：当AI越来越接近通用智能，一定程度上在试图复制人类的思维方式。电脑在短期内...（可能影响）比方说证券交易。随着时间的推移，AI也许会复制人类思维。你认为，相对于人类的行为，AI仍然会出错吗？ **Seth Klarman:** A caveat that anything to do with technology, you've got the wrong guest. And that I need to know about it. I need to be up to speed. I need to have an opinion about where it might go. But I'm not an early adapter. I don't fool around with it the way some people do. So my opinion may not be as good as some people. **塞思·卡拉曼**：先提个醒，若想了解任何与技术相关的事情，你可能找错人了。我需要去了解它，我需要跟上时代的步伐，我需要对技术的发展方向有自己的看法，但我不是一个技术产品的早期采用者，我不像某些人那样成天玩弄它，所以我的意见可能不如某些人好。 But when I think about it, first of all, my understanding of AI is that it is trained to look at enormous amounts of past data. I don't fully understand how that is done because, for example, up until 2022, we'd hit the longest bull market in history. And so depending on what period one looked at, one might think: "well, the absence of a bull market, maybe we were past that." Is that right? Or is it pent up that the absence of a down market, the straight up 12 years of bull market that ended in 21. 话虽如此，当我思考这个问题时，首先，我对AI的理解是，它是通过查阅大量历史数据而被训练出来，我不完全理解这如何能做到。例如，直到2022年，我们经历了历史上最长的牛市。因此，根据所观察的时期，人们可能会想：“牛市中断过，也许我们已经开始了新一轮牛市。”是这样吗？还是说，由于很久没有熊市，这个持续了12年的牛市将会终结。 It's like if you're waiting for a bus, and the buses, as you know from the schedule, come every 15 minutes. And it's been 45 minutes. So either four or five buses are gonna come right away, or the road is collapsed and no buses are coming, which is it? 这就好比你在等公交车，按时刻表每隔15分钟就该有一班，但现在已经过了45分钟。所以，要么马上有四五辆公交车就要来了，要么道路坍塌了，公交车不会来了。到底是哪种情况呢？ What will the computer tell you? Which is it? Those are hard questions. I don't think humans will always know the answers. I think AI will be amazing at saying, oh, well, when I, when the Suez Canal gets closed by an attack of some sort, here's what happens to oil prices or here's what happens to GDP around the world in the next quarter? Or when there's a war in Europe, here's what happens. And computers will figure that out and humans would have to ton of work to catch up. And maybe computers will see connections that aren't easily seen. 电脑会告诉你是哪一种情况吗？这些是很难回答的问题，我不认为人类总能知道其中的答案。在我看来，AI将非常擅长预测当苏伊士运河因某种攻击而关闭时，油价或下一季度的全球GDP会怎样？或者当欧洲爆发战争时会怎么样？电脑能计算出这些结果，而人类则需做大量工作才能追赶上。也许电脑还能发现一些不易察觉的相关性。 But how will a computer figure out the next Telecor and Electro Rent? And Electro Rent hasn't been public. There are no published financials yet, although they'll be in the proxy eventually. I don't know how they'd know Telecor shareholders would get or how to think about the contingencies around those kind of liquidation distributions, and that's not the most complicated thing that could come along. How will they think about what a bankrupt or near bankrupt bond might get into restructuring? Yeah, I just don't know. To somebody who really is sophisticated AI, maybe that sounds naive. But to me, I believe that it's likely that artificial intelligence dealing with a sample size of close to 1 on a particular oddball transaction may not know what to project. 但是，电脑如何能找出下一个Telecor和Electro Rent呢？Electro Rent都没上市，没有公开的财务数据，尽管代理机构最终会公布。我不知道电脑将如何知道Telecor的股东会得到什么？或者电脑将如何思考那些围绕清算分配的突发情况？这还不是最复杂的事。电脑将如何思考哪只破产或濒临破产的债券可能进入重组？再次重申，我不知道。对于那些精通AI的人来说，这也许听上去很幼稚，但对我来说，我相信AI很可能不知道如何预测某笔样本量接近于1的特殊交易。 So in effect, how does Baupost practice value investing? I think that we're set up not on a basis of let's look at the world like other people. We don't have industry analysts per se. We don't focus on a certain equity list of, let's know, these 200 stocks or let's look at certain kinds of industries cuz we like their growth prospects. We're set up in a much more opportunistic way. Where are inefficiencies right now and where are they likely to lie and how do we get them to come into our inbox so we can look at them. We're looking for supply, demand imbalances in the market. 那么，Baupost是如何实践价值投资的呢？我认为，我们不是建立在让我们像其他人一样看待世界的基础上。我们没有特定行业的分析师。我们不会设置某个股票白名单，（然后说）就让我们了解这200只股票。我们也不会仅仅因为喜欢它们的增长前景，就关注某些行业。我们的设置更具有机会主义色彩（We're set up in a much more opportunistic way）。当前市场低效的地方可能在哪？如何让它们进入我们的视野，以便我们进行研究？我们寻找的是市场上供需失衡的机会。 Now if you told me a stock in Turkey is going to be delisted from an exchange, I would tell you that while we don't look at Turkey, we might start to figure out that stock because when it's off the exchange and out of an index, there might be a lot of people that have to sell it. And there might be a lot of people that, cause I follow that index that don't hold it anymore. And so all of a sudden, you've had a chance, that stock price just falls into some kind of black hole. 现在，如果你告诉我土耳其的一只股票将从交易所摘牌，我会告诉你，虽然我们不看土耳其，但我们可能会开始关注这只股票。因为当它从交易所摘牌并从指数中剔除时，可能会有很多人不得不卖掉它，可能会有很多跟踪该指数的人不再持有这只股票。所以突然之间，股价可能会跌穿谷底，你就有机会了。 I think a computer could, of course, figure that out. It could say delisting leads to lower prices and then maybe make the connection that sometimes that's overshot in some new incarnation, the company gets taken over or can come back into an index. 当然，我认为电脑在这方面还是有用武之地的。它也许能推算出‘退市将导致股价下跌’，然后通过某种关联分析，告诉你退市有时导致股价超跌，或者公司以某种新面貌被收购，可以重新纳入指数。 But when you multiply that by all the kinds of things that lead to these mispriced things and imbalances, is it a downgrade? Is it bankruptcy filing itself? What about with a private asset? Graham and Dodd didn't write about private assets. They didn't write about real estate, they didn't write about privately owned companies. Yet the same general principles that cause stocks to overshoot can cause business prices to overshoot. Financing becomes less available, so buyers will need pony up more money as equity and therefore, the price drops. Somebody needs to get a loan that's turning sour off their books by the end of the quarter, a bank or an insurance company or a real estate fund formed 12 years ago that has one or two more assets. And once the last assets off the book, so they can close out the fund and maybe now go raise the next fund or the fund after that. 但当你把它与各种导致错误定价和价格失衡的因素相乘，这是因为一次降级吗？是破产申请本身导致的吗？私人资产又如何呢？格雷厄姆和多德没有写私人资产。他们没有写过房地产。他们也没写过私人拥有的公司。然而，导致股票超调的一般性原则同样能导致企业价格超调：比如融资变得越来越难获得，所以买家需要拿出更多资金作为股本，从而导致价格下跌；再比如，银行、保险公司需要在季度末将一笔不良贷款从账上清理出去；或者，一家12年前成立的房地产基金，还剩下一两个资产，一旦将最后几项资产变现，他们就可以关闭该基金，去募集下一笔或下下笔基金。 Tracking that way, sourcing opportunities that way is so different that, again, I don't know what a machine could be trained to do. It's not easy to train humans to do it. Maybe it'll be easier to train machines, but I'm not sure because it really is a lot of sample sizes of one. You see patterns, but patterns don't exactly repeat. That is what we're doing. That is what Baupost has done for 40 years. 以这种方式追踪机会，以这种方式寻找机会，（与传统做法）截然不同。我还是那句话，我不知道机器能被训练成什么样子。训练人类做这件事并不容易，也许训练机器会更容易，我不确定，因为这涉及到大量样本量为1的样本。你能看到模式，但模式不会完全重复。这就是我们正在做的事情，这就是Baupost 40年来所做的。 We're looking/hunting broad and wide. I like to say we go miles wide to look for opportunity. And then when we think we found it, then we drill miles deep. Maybe the contrast is that other people are going miles deep first, so they know everything about every industry, they know deeply pharma and auto and finance and whatever else, but they're not as focused on why might any of this be particularly mispriced. 我们正广之又广的搜寻猎物，我喜欢说我们在数英里的范围内寻找机会，当我们认为找到时，我们再深入钻探。也许与此形成鲜明对比的是，其他人先钻得很深，他们对每个行业都了如指掌，对制药、汽车、金融和其他行业都很了解，但他们并不重视为什么是这些行业中的一个被错误定价了（They're not as focused on why might any of this be particularly mispriced）。 And in fact, maybe they're actually oriented towards not going where the mispricings are. Is stock mispriced because management has not done a good job lately? That's hard for people to recommend to their clients or to their bosses, or maybe the company was involved in something that left them with a degree of stigma, a failed acquisition, or a management misstep. And yet, those things can cause prices to really get out of whack and lead to opportunity. So that's the challenge to find ways, to find the bargain. 事实上，其他机构也许倾向于不去错误定价的地方。股票定价错误是因为管理层最近工作不力吗？这很难让人们向客户或上司推荐，或者公司卷入了某些事情，给他们留下了一定程度的污名，比如收购失败，或者管理失误。然而，这些都可能导致价格失衡，从而带来机遇。因此，这就是寻找方法、找到便宜货的挑战。 In a sense, you have to be right about less. When you don't have to be particularly right about what's the business going to grow into over the next 10 years, maybe right this second, it's 30 or 40 or 50 percent undervalued. 在某种意义上，你必须对更少的事情做出正确的判断。当你不必对企业未来 10 年的发展前景特别有把握时，也许此时此刻，它的价值就被低估了 30%、40% 或 50%。 Now, the world has changed more in recent years. So that because of technological disruption. 近年来，由于技术的颠覆，世界在发生快速变化。 In Graham's day, he could look at a balance sheet and an income statement and say, "look, I'm buying this stock at six times earnings and two-thirds of working capital, or two-thirds of book value", and probably be right about that and realize that the tables will turn "what's out of favor will come back into favor", which is what the quote from Horace, the poet that's at the beginning of Intelligent Investor. 在格雷厄姆的时代，他可以看着资产负债表和损益表说，“我要以6倍PE、2/3的营运资本，或0.7倍的PB买入这只股票”，并知道自己很可能是对的，形势会逆转。“失宠的东西将会重获青睐”（What's out of favor will come back into favor），这正是《聪明的投资者》开头引用的诗人贺拉斯的名言。 But what changes now is a business could be doing just fine, but if somebody's working on something in their garage that's going to disrupt that company. 但当今不一样的是，一家企业目前或许做得不错，但如果有人在自己车库里捣鼓出什么颠覆性的东西。 Five years from now, that company may barely exist or certainly become a lot less profitable. And so, an investor has to be thinking about not just cyclical change like Graham and Dodd were worried about in the depression but secular change as well. 5年后这家公司可能就不存在了，或者盈利肯定会大打折扣。因此，投资者不仅要思考如同格雷厄姆和多德在经济萧条时期所担心的周期性变化，还得思考长期变化。 And the combination of that I think has made investing harder and value investing harder that investors can't just crunch a few numbers and say this is mispriced. They need to dig a lot deeper than that. There's nothing wrong with hard work and I think the investors who look will continue to find mispricing and opportunity. 我认为，这两者的结合使得投资变得更难了，也使价值投资变得更难了。投资者不能只计算几个数字就说这只股票被错误定价了，他们需要挖掘得更深。勤奋工作总是没错，我认为那些用心观察的投资者能继续发现错误定价的机会。 # Sourcing # Diligence # Portfolio construction # Risk management # Illiquidity # International investing # Current environment # Alignment with clients # Succession at Baupost # Perspectives on Securities Analysis and Margin of Safety # Boston Red Sox # Horse Racing # Philanthropy