原文信息： - 标题：Thoughts on Buffett Selling Apple - 作者：John Huber - 发表时间：2024-08-09 - 链接：[Base Hit Investing](https://basehitinvesting.substack.com/p/thoughts-on-buffett-selling-apple) - 翻译：Terrellchen --- # Thoughts on Buffett Selling Apple
对巴菲特出售苹果股票的看法 We found out in May that Buffett is selling some Apple shares. At the time, it seemed like a sizable amount, and since Buffett doesn’t typically trim, it likely meant further sales were coming. Last week, the Berkshire quarterly report indicated a much larger sale. 五月份的消息显示，巴菲特正在抛售一部分苹果股票。那时的数量似乎相当可观，鉴于巴菲特一般不会进行小规模减持，这可能预示着后续还会有更多的抛售行为。上周，伯克希尔哈撒韦的季度报告进一步证实了这一点，显示了一次规模更大的股票抛售。 The sheer size of the dollar amount of the sale is eye-popping (over \$100 billion and perhaps climbing), but I don’t believe is actually that surprising if you think about the history of his investment approach. While Buffett is known for being a long-term investor, very few of his stock investments are actually permanent holdings. He views stocks of quality companies as safe when they are cheap, but those same quality businesses are risky stocks when they are expensive. And the rare occasions where he didn’t sell a stock that reached fair value, he has occasionally regretted it (more on this below). 此次出售的金额之大令人瞠目（超过 1,000 亿美元，或许还在增加），但如果考虑到巴菲特投资历史，我认为这其实并不令人吃惊。虽然巴菲特以长期投资者著称，但他的股票投资实际上很少是长期持有的。他认为优质公司的股票便宜时是安全的，但这些优质公司的股票昂贵时则是有风险的。在极少数情况下，他没有卖出达到公允价值的股票，但偶尔也会后悔（下文将详细介绍）。 One thing his Apple sale is **not**: a market prediction. I’ve seen all kinds of commentary that references the Apple sale in the context that Buffett is bearish or is predicting a market decline. He has always said he doesn’t have any idea what the market is going to do near term (nor does anyone else). He is not predicting anything bad happening to Apple or to stocks in general. I think his Apple sale is simply a product of his investment process. The stock has become more expensive, offering less value, and therefore he views cash as a better alternative. It says much about Apple’s valuation, but little about where the stock is headed next. 他出售苹果股票的行为**不是**：对市场的预测。我看到过各种各样的评论，在提到出售苹果公司时，都说巴菲特看跌或预测市场会下跌。他总是说，他不知道市场近期会怎么走（其他人也不知道）。他并没有预测苹果或整个股市将面临不利情况。我认为他抛售苹果股票仅仅是基于他的投资逻辑。这只股票变得越来越贵，价值越来越低，因此他认为现金是更好的选择。这更多地说明了苹果的估值问题，而不是关于股票接下来的走势。 ## Berkshire’s Cash Hoard
伯克希尔的现金囤积 What is stunning is the amount of cash that Berkshire now has, likely approaching or even exceeding \$300 billion at the current moment assuming some additional cash inflows from operating companies and perhaps even some further Apple sales post-quarter end. 令人惊叹的是伯克希尔目前拥有的现金量，假设运营公司有额外的现金流入，甚至可能在季度结束后进一步出售苹果，那么目前的现金量可能接近甚至超过 3000 亿美元。 Similar to erroneously concluding (in my humble opinion) that Apple sales are a harbinger of trouble, people are also attributing the massive cash pile as a bearish indicator on the economy or the stock market. It’s possible that Buffett has some views on the economy near term given his perch atop one of America’s most diversified conglomerate, but he’s never tried to “time the market”. Even in 1969 when he wound down his stock fund, he wasn’t timing the market but simply using valuation as his guidepost. He couldn’t find any ideas so cash was building up and he decided to close. He viewed stocks as risky, but it was 4-5 years before any of that risk manifested itself in the form of falling prices. He is clear that he’s not timing, he’s simply evaluating risk and using value as his North Star. 类似于错误地得出结论（在我个人看来）认为苹果的销售是一个麻烦的先兆，人们也将巨额现金储备视为经济或股市看跌的指标。巴菲特可能对经济的短期前景有一些看法，毕竟他位于美国最多元化的集团之一的顶端，但他从未试图“预测市场”。即使在1969年他关闭了他的股票基金时，他也不是在预测市场，而是简单地使用估值作为他的指南。他找不到任何点子，所以现金越来越多，他决定关闭。他认为股票是有风险的，但那是在风险以价格下跌的形式显现出来之前的4-5年。他明确表示他不是在预测市场，他只是在评估风险，并将价值作为他决策的指南针。 The same is true now. Buffett’s \$300 billion in cash is not because he expects a crash. It’s because it’s extremely difficult for him to find any investments to make. 现在也是如此。巴菲特拥有 3,000 亿美元的现金，并不是因为他预计会出现崩盘。而是因为他很难找到任何投资机会。 How difficult? Let’s review some simplified math: 有多难？让我们回顾一下简化的数学计算： There are probably only 30-40 stocks in the US and perhaps 100 or so worldwide that Berkshire can buy that will make a difference to the portfolio: 伯克希尔能买入的、对投资组合有影响的股票，在美国可能只有 30-40 只，在全球可能只有 100 只左右： - \$600b portfolio including stocks and cash; 5% position = \$30b
包括股票和现金在内的 6000 亿美元投资组合；5% 的仓位 = 300 亿美元 - This limits his universe to \$300b market caps at 10% ownership
这就把他的投资范围限制在 3,000 亿美元市值的股票上，持股比例为 10% - There are only 27 stocks in the US this size
美国只有 27 只股票达到这个规模 - If we go to 20% ownership, that opens it up to an additional 50 or so; but it's difficult to buy that much, and this is only for a 5% portfolio position!
如果我们将持股比例提高到 20%，就会增加 50 多只股票；但很难买到这么多，而且这还只是投资组合 5% 仓位的股票！ - I estimate there are likely only 30-40 stocks in the US he can buy to build a 5% position, and a much smaller handful to get a 10% position (his preferred level of size)
我估计，要建立 5% 的仓位，他在美国可能只能买 30-40 只股票，而要达到 10% 的仓位（他喜欢的仓位水平），能买的股票就少得多了。 - So his universe is 30-40 stocks in the US, and maybe 100 worldwide that he would look at
因此，他的投资范围是美国的 30-40 只股票，全球可能有 100 只。 - But how many of these stocks would he even want to own? Probably only a small minority
但他到底想持有多少股票呢？可能只是少数 - Of those, how many offer current valuations that make sense to him? A fraction of that small minority, if any...
在这些股票中，有多少股票的当前估值对他来说是合理的？即使有，也只是少数中的一小部分...... The incredible size of the portfolio, plus the high valuations in large cap stocks, makes it almost impossible to put cash to work at the rates of return he'd like (double digits). It's not market timing, it's just a product of valuation levels and a very tiny opportunity set that shrinks each year. 令人难以置信的投资组合规模，再加上大盘股的高估值，让他几乎不可能以他想要的回报率（两位数）配置现金。这不是在尝试预测市场，这只是估值水平和每年都在缩减的极小投资选择范围的结果。 I do think large cap stocks are relatively expensive, but as [I discussed in the last post on Walter Schloss](https://basehitinvesting.substack.com/p/walter-schloss-nifty-fifty-current), there are a number of opportunities for the rest of us mere mortals in smaller stocks, some of which have been left behind and offer a nice combination of low prices and quality capital allocation (a few example among many others can be found [here](https://basehitinvesting.substack.com/p/a-royalty-on-the-growth-of-others), [here](https://basehitinvesting.substack.com/p/a-value-investors-bank) and [here](https://basehitinvesting.substack.com/p/hospital-owner-at-a-14-fcf-yield). 我确实认为大盘股相对昂贵，但正如我在上一篇关于沃尔特-施洛斯的文章中所讨论的，对于我们这些普通的凡人来说，在小盘股中有很多机会，其中一些被忽视了，它们提供了低价格和优质资本配置的良好组合（在许多其他例子中可以找到一些）。 Buffett’s own investments in Japan also are worth reviewing (see [this post](https://basehitinvesting.substack.com/p/buffetts-44-cagr-and-various-types) for some thoughts on opportunities he is finding even at his current size). 巴菲特自己在日本的投资也值得回顾（参见本帖，了解他以目前的规模所发现的一些机会）。 ## Lesson Learned on Coke
从可口可乐中学到的教训 One reason could be a [big lesson he learned a quarter century ago when he did not sell Coke at 50 P/E](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oWpXM3sVAek): 其中一个原因可能是他在25年前没有以 50 倍市盈率卖出可口可乐时吸取的重大教训： > "Coca Cola is a fabulous company that was selling at a silly price… You can definitely fault me for not selling the stock. I always thought it was a wonderful business, but clearly at 50 times earnings it was a silly price." — Buffett, 2006 annual meeting
“可口可乐是一家了不起的公司，当时的价格却很荒谬……你完全可以因为我没有卖出这只股票而责怪我。我一直认为它是一家很棒的企业，但显然，以 50 倍的市盈率来看，那是一个荒谬的价格。” —— 巴菲特，2006年年会 He also didn’t sell Coke in 1998 when it got to very expensive levels and has said that not selling at those valuations was a mistake. I think many of our largest and highest quality stocks are reaching levels that approach the Coke of 1998 type valuations ([see last post for more comments](https://basehitinvesting.substack.com/p/walter-schloss-nifty-fifty-current) on some of today’s Nifty Fifty-esque valuations). 1998 年，当可口可乐股价达到非常昂贵的水平时，他也没有卖出，并表示在当时的估值下没有卖出是一个错误。我认为，我们许多最大、最优质的股票正达到接近 1998 年可口可乐那种估值水平（更多评论见上一篇文章关于当今一些类似 Nifty Fifty 的估值）。 Buffett is known for a buy and hold forever investor, but I think there have been some broad misinterpretations of his investment approach that have seemed to gain traction over the past decade. I am going to share some notes on this blog from the BPL partnership letters and also some notes on his investments from the Berkshire letters, with an emphasis on some of the actual transactions as opposed to the description of his philosophy. Buffett is, and always been, a value investor first and foremost. He rarely if ever [pays more than 15 P/E for a stock](https://twitter.com/JohnHuber72/status/1704452049914478653), often less than 10 P/E. And he also has more portfolio turnover than many might realize (just examine his holdings from each decade and notice how different they are). He often sells stocks (especially in the earlier years) when they reached an expensive price, and has occasionally regretted not selling (e.g. Coke in 1998). 巴菲特是出了名的 “买入并永远持有 ”的投资者，但我认为，在过去十年中，人们似乎对他的投资方法产生了一些广泛的误读。我将在博客上分享 BPL 合伙企业信件中的一些注释，以及伯克希尔信件中关于他投资的一些注释，重点是一些实际交易，而不是对他理念的描述。巴菲特首先是，而且始终是一个价值投资者。他很少为一只股票支付超过 15 倍市盈率，经常低于 10 倍市盈率。他的投资组合周转率也比许多人意识到的要高（只要检查一下他每十年的持股，就会发现它们有多大的不同）。他经常在股票达到昂贵价格时卖出（尤其是早年），偶尔也会后悔没有卖出（如 1998 年的可口可乐）。 He is first and foremost sensitive to risk. He demands a margin of safety and when stocks get too expensive, they naturally become risker. Even in recent years with no need for additional cash, he’s shown a willingness to sell stocks that are fairly valued (BYD, AAPL, CVX, BAC) or when he changes his mind about the business (WFC, PARA, TSMC among others). 他首先对风险很敏感。他要求有一定的安全边际，当股票价格过高时，风险自然会增大。即使在不需要额外现金的近几年，他也愿意卖出估值合理的股票（比亚迪、AAPL、CVX、BAC），或者当他对公司改变看法时（WFC、PARA、台积电等）。 He has always behaved in this way since he started investing in the 1950’s: buying undervalued securities and selling them when they reach fair value, when he finds something better, or when he changes his mind. He owns stocks for a long time, but rarely forever, simply because securities prices fluctuate a lot more than business values. 自 20 世纪 50 年代开始投资以来，他一直都是这样做的：买入价值被低估的证券，然后在证券达到公允价值、发现更好的投资机会或改变主意时卖出。他长期持有股票，但很少永远持有，原因很简单，证券价格的波动比商业价值的波动要大得多。 Given enough time, Mr. Market eventually will offer compelling enough prices to entice you to swap money for future earnings or vice versa. 只要有足够的时间，市场先生最终会给出足够诱人的价格，吸引你用金钱换取未来的收益，反之亦然。 ## Will Berkshire Pay a Dividend?
伯克希尔会分红吗？ A lot of people have asked me whether the huge cash is finally going to lead to a dividend at Berkshire. In short, I don’t think so, at least not while Buffett is in charge. I might be wrong on this view, but I think he still views cash inside Berkshire as safer than in the hands of the majority of his shareholders (many of whom are his family members and original partners). 很多人问我，巨额现金是否最终会导致伯克希尔分红。简而言之，我认为不会，至少在巴菲特掌权期间不会。我的看法可能是错的，但我认为他仍然认为伯克希尔公司内部的现金比他的大多数股东（其中许多是他的家庭成员和原始合伙人）手中的现金更安全。 Some thoughts: 一些想法 - It makes sense to pay a dividend if shareholders have a better place to put the cash. However, I really think Buffett views the market as expensive, and thus he doesn’t necessarily want his owners to suffer the fate of incurring a tax on the dividend and then putting it into an inferior investment (S&P 500).
如果股东能将资金投向更好的机会，那么支付股息是合理的。但我确实认为巴菲特认为市场估值偏高，因此他可能不希望他的股东们在缴纳股息税之后，将资金投入到一个不那么理想的投资选项中（例如标准普尔500指数）。 - It’s possible he still views Berkshire as a better compounding vehicle than what his owners could achieve on their own (especially after factoring in the 23% capital gains tax on the dividends).
有可能他仍然认为伯克希尔是比其所有者自己所能实现的更好的复利工具（尤其是在考虑了股息 23% 的资本利得税之后）。 - Also, paying a dividend forces this tax upon all shareholders, whether they want it or not. He has long said that owners who want a dividend can simply sell off 4% or their shares (or whatever amount they want), which would function very similar to a dividend.
此外，无论股东是否愿意，支付股息都会迫使所有股东缴纳这种税。他早就说过，想要分红的所有者可以直接出售 4% 的股份（或任何他们想要的数额），这与分红的功能非常相似。 - I think he views keeping the money invested in T-bills (for the time being) as a better place than giving it to owners (with the government taking nearly 1/4th cut of that), only to have the owners turn around and put it into T-bills themselves (or worse, invest in overvalued stocks)
我认为，他认为把这些钱投资于国库券（暂时）比把钱交给所有者（政府从中抽取近 1/4），然后再让所有者自己把钱投资于国库券（或者更糟糕的是，投资于估值过高的股票）要好得多。 I’m not suggesting this is the best decision, and it certainly doesn’t mean that some owners have a much better use of the money somewhere else, but those owners could simply sell their BRK shares if they had a better place for the money. 我并不是说这是最好的决定，当然这也并不意味着有些所有者在其他地方有更好的资金用途，但如果这些所有者有更好的资金用途，他们完全可以卖掉他们的 BRK 股票。 ## Inflation, Deficit Spending, Tax Rates
通胀、赤字支出、税率 Longtime readers of Buffett will know that he’s always been wary about inflation. He bought gold stocks in the 1970’s as an inflation hedge (with varying degrees of success). He has written in years past about the perils of too much government debt, fiscal spending, trade deficits and the risk to the value of the dollar. 长期关注巴菲特的读者都知道，他一直对通货膨胀保持警惕。他在 20 世纪 70 年代购买了黄金股票作为通胀对冲工具（效果有好有坏）。过去几年，他曾撰文谈及过多的政府债务、财政支出、贸易赤字和美元价值风险的危险。 He mentioned the likelihood of tax rates going higher at the last annual meeting. He’s clearly concerned about the deficit: no politician wants to cut spending so the only way to keep the deficit under control is to raise taxes. That might lead to lower values: if tax rate goes from 21% back to 35%, that results in an instant 18% decline in domestic earnings, making stocks more expensive than they currently are — a stock valued at 25 P/E suddenly becomes a 30 P/E if the “E” drops by 18%. I think the probability of Democrats winning the White House and gaining seats in Congress is still quite low for this election cycle, but given the desire of both parties to continuing spending far more than we’re earning as a country, I think the prospect for higher taxes is almost a certainty over time. For politicians, raising revenues is always more expedient than cutting spending. 在上一次年会上，他提到了税率上升的可能性。他显然对赤字问题感到担忧：没有政治家愿意削减开支，所以控制赤字的唯一方法就是提高税收。这可能会导致公司价值下降：如果税率从 21% 回升到 35%，那么国内盈利将立即下降 18%，使股票比现在更昂贵——如果“E”（每股收益）下降 18%，那么原本估值为 25 倍市盈率的股票突然就变成了 30 倍市盈率。我认为民主党赢得白宫并在国会获得更多席位的可能性在这个选举周期仍然相当低，但鉴于两党都有继续超支的倾向，我认为长期来看，提高税收几乎是确定无疑的。对于政客们来说，增加收入总是比削减开支来得更直接。 Of course, many companies in the S&P have earnings overseas that wouldn’t be affected by tax changes here, but in general, tax increases means lower earnings and thus lower corporate values. I think Buffett expects higher taxes due to the budget issues we have in the US, and therefore stock prices might be more expensive at current levels than they appear. 当然，标准普尔指数中的许多公司在海外有盈利，不会受到国内税收变化的影响，但总的来说，增税意味着盈利减少，从而降低公司价值。我认为，由于美国的预算问题，巴菲特预计税收会增加，因此目前的股票价格可能比表面上看起来更贵。 But he wouldn’t be selling Apple if he thought the shares were still undervalued. He’s selling because he thinks cash is more attractive than the Apple shares he was willing to part with. 但是，如果他认为苹果公司的股价仍然被低估，他就不会卖掉苹果公司。他之所以卖出，是因为他认为现金比他愿意放弃的苹果股票更有吸引力。 To sum it up, I think what Mr. Buffett is doing (or not doing) with his cash is almost irrelevant to most of us. His portfolio is simply too big to invest in all but probably 100 or so stocks around the world that fit his criteria, and very few of those large cap stocks are priced attractively. 总而言之，我认为巴菲特先生在用现金做什么（或不做什么）与我们大多数人几乎无关。他的投资组合太大了，除了全球大概 100 多只符合他的标准的股票外，根本无法投资其他所有股票，而且这些大盘股中价格具有吸引力的股票少之又少。 Thankfully, most of us have thousands of stocks to choose from, many of which offer great value, especially compared to the largest stocks in the S&P 500. 值得庆幸的是，我们大多数人都有成千上万只股票可供选择，其中许多都具有很高的价值，尤其是与标准普尔 500 指数中最大的股票相比。