原文信息：

- 标题：Importance of ROIC Part 5: A Glance at the Last 42 Years of Wells Fargo
- 作者：John Huber
- 发表时间：2014-10-10
- 链接：[Saber Capital](https://sabercapitalmgt.com/importance-of-roic-part-5-a-glance-at-the-last-42-years-of-wells-fargo/)

翻译信息：

- 参考翻译：[景泉 Value](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/hsIoaaDNFqX7yXV3RWwpXw)，[旭犇投资](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/bOYuLkLll6yh0uPXsXPXew)
- 校译：Ponge

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> “Experience, however, indicates that the best business returns are usually achieved by companies that are doing something quite similar today to what they were doing five or ten years ago… a business that constantly encounters major change also encounters many chances for major error. Furthermore, economic terrain that is forever shifting violently is ground on which it is difficult to build a fortress-like business franchise. Such a franchise is usually the key to sustained high returns.”
> 
> –Warren Buffett, [1987 Shareholder Letter](http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1987.html)_

> “然而，经验表明，一个企业今天做的事情与五年或十年前做的事情非常相似，这类企业往往能实现最好的商业回报……一个经常面临重大变化的企业也同样有可能遇到许多重大错误。此外，在不断剧烈变动的经济领域很难建立堡垒式的商业特许经营权。而这样的特许经营权往往是持续获得高回报的关键因素。”
> 
> ——沃伦·巴菲特，1987[^1987]年[致股东的信](https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1987.html)

[In the last post](https://sabercapitalmgt.com/importance-of-roic-part-4-the-math-of-compounding/), I compared two hypothetical companies using some basic math regarding returns on capital.

在[上一篇文章](../John_Huber/Importance_of_ROIC_Part_4.md)中，我们用一些基础的数学方法比较了基于不同投资回报率的两家假想公司最终的投资收益情况。

It helps to keep this general formula in mind, which is a rough estimate for how fast a business will compound intrinsic value over time… A business will compound value at a rate that approximates the following product: **ROIC x Reinvestment Rate.**

牢记这个通用公式会很有帮助，它可以粗略估计出一个企业随着时间的推移其内在价值的复合速度……基本上，一个企业内在价值的增长速度等于等于两个因素的乘积：**增量投入资本回报率（ROIC）×再投资率。**

To look at a real life simple example, let’s look at a company I’ve discussed before: [Wells Fargo](https://sabercapitalmgt.com/tag/wfc/). Just for fun, I decided to check out the price in 1972, since I like looking at [historical annual reports](http://www.wellsfargohistory.com/archives/annual-reports/wells-fargo-one/) and I wanted to use a year where the stock market was in a bubble (and about to crash 50%). 42 years ago, the stock market was at the end of what is now known as the “Nifty-Fifty” bubble. It was a stock market where many large cap stocks were being bought at 40-50 times earnings or more by newly created mutual funds that were gathering assets at a feverish pace and were putting this inflow of cash to work at ever rising stock prices regardless of valuations. We know how this ended: by 1974 stocks had lost half their value, mutual funds went from uber-bullish at the top of the market to uber-bearish at the bottom, and valuations became much more reasonable.

如果在现实生活中举一个简单的例子，可以看看我之前讨论过的一家公司：[富国银行](https://sabercapitalmgt.com/tag/wfc/)（Wells Fargo）。为了让讨论更加有趣，我决定选取富国银行1972年的价格作为起点。我很喜欢回顾富国银行的[历史年度报告](http://www.wellsfargohistory.com/archives/annual-reports/wells-fargo-one/)。而且，我想选取股市处于泡沫（并即将暴跌50%）时的年份。42年前，股票市场正处于现在被称为“漂亮50”泡沫的末期。在当时的股市中，许多大盘股被新成立的共同基金以40-50倍或更高的市盈率买入。这些基金正以疯狂的速度募集资金，并将新资金不断买入大盘股，导致其股价无视估值水平不断上涨。我们知道这一切是如何结束的：到1974年，很多股票市值已经缩水了一半，共同基金从市场顶部的超级乐观变成底部的超级悲观，与此同时，公司的估值变得更加合理。

I wanted to use a year where stock prices were generally expensive to ensure that I wasn’t using data from a market bottom, and to also show that even in a bubble year, a business that subsequently continues to produce high returns on capital will create shareholder value.

我之所以想用股价普遍存在泡沫的一年，是想确保我没有使用市场底部时的数据，同时也要表明，即使从泡沫时开始算起，一家在之后能够继续创造高资本回报的企业也最终能创造股东价值。

In 1972, Wells Fargo was trading at $0.59 per share (obviously, adjusted for splits). Today the stock trades around $52 per share, roughly 88 times the price it was in the 1972 market top. In other words, WFC has compounded its stock price at 11.4% annually, not including dividends. If we include dividends, shareholders have seen around **14% total annual returns over the past four+ decades**.

在1972年的时候，富国银行的股价为0.59美元/股（很明显，经过了拆分调整）。目前，富国银行的股价大约是52美元/股，大约是1972年市场顶峰时价格的88倍。也就是说，富国银行剔除股息的股价复合增长率为11.4%。如果我们把股息计算在内，**在过去的40多年里，股东的年化回报率约为14%。**

How did this happen? There are many reasons, but let’s just look at the math (i.e. the results of management’s execution, we’ll leave the “why” for another time).

这一切是如何发生的？原因有很多，但让我们专注于数字（也即管理层经营的结果，我们把“为什么会有这样的结果”留待下次讨论）。

So to review this math, I pulled up an old annual report showing financial data from the early 70’s. [The 1974 WFC annual report](http://www.wellsfargohistory.com/download/annualreports/1974annualreport_wf.pdf) is the first one to provide market prices for the stock, as well as book value data. So I got 1972’s numbers from the ‘74 report.

为了回顾这个过程，我去一份旧的年度报告中找到了20世纪70年代早期的财务数据。[富国银行1974年的年报](http://www.wellsfargohistory.com/download/annualreports/1974annualreport_wf.pdf)是第一份同时提供当时股票价格以及账面价值的报告。所以我从1974年的年报里找到了1972年的数据。

Here are some key numbers to look at from **1972** _(again, I adjusted these for splits)_:

下面是1972年的一些关键数据（同样经过了拆分调整）：

-   **1972 WFC Book Value: $0.40**
-   **1972 WFC Stock Price: $0.59**
-   **1972 WFC ROE: 10.9%**
-   **1972 WFC P/B Ratio: 1.5**

* 富国银行1972年的每股账面价值：0.40美元；
* 富国银行1972年的每股价格：0.59美元；
* 富国银行1972年的ROE：10.9%；
* 富国银行1972年的市净率：1.5。

Let’s compare that to the numbers from halfway through **2014**:

让我们将其与2014年中报的数据进行对比：

-   **2014 WFC Book Value: $31.18**
-   **2014 WFC Stock Price: ~$52**
-   **2014 WFC ROE: 13.5%**
-   **2014 WFC P/B Ratio: 1.6**

* 富国银行2014年中期的每股账面价值：31.18美元；
* 富国银行2014年中期的每股价格：约52美元；
* 富国银行2014年中期的ROE：13.5%；
* 富国银行2014年中期的市净率：1.6。

So in the past 41 and a half years, Wells Fargo has:

因此，在过去的41年半里，富国银行：

-   **Compounded Book Value at 11.1%**
-   **Compounded Stock Price (not including dividends) at 11.4%**
-   **Earning power has compounded at 11.7%** (earnings have grown from around $0.04 to over $4.00 per share)
-   **P/B Ratio is roughly the same as it was 42 years ago**

* 每股账面价值的年化增速：11.1%；
* 每股价格（不考虑股息）的年化增速：11.4%；
* 盈利能力的年化增速：11.7%（每股收益从约0.04美元上升到超过4美元）；
* 市净率和42年前大致相同。

As you can see, the intrinsic value of the enterprise (as evidenced by the compounding net worth and earning power) has compounded very nicely over a long period of time, which has led to similar returns for shareholders. If we include dividends, shareholders have seen around 14% annual returns, even if they invested toward the top of the 1972 bubble.

正如你所看到的，企业的内在价值（用复权的净资产和盈利表示）在很长一段时间内有非常好的复利增长，这也为股东创造了同等水平的回报。如果我们把股息计算在内，即使他们的投资始于1972年股市泡沫的顶端，依然能够获得约14%的年化收益率。

This year I spent a lot of time paging through many old Wells Fargo annual reports. If you look back over time, you’ll find that Wells Fargo produced mid-teen returns on its equity capital over the past four decades:

今年，我花了很多时间翻阅富国银行的历史年报。如果你回头看，你会发现富国银行在过去的40多年里，其ROE一直维持在百分之十几的水平。

![](../Elements/ROIC/Wells-Fargo-Historical-ROE1.jpeg)

Some interesting things to note about the last 42 years:

从图中可知，在过去的42年里，有一些特征很有意思：

-   **Wells Fargo was profitable every single year (42 for 42)**
-   **Earnings increased from the previous year 35 out of 42 years**
-   **ROE averaged about 15%**

* 富国银行每年都实现了正盈利（42年中有42年都是正盈利）；
* 42年中有35年盈利都实现了正增长；
* 平均ROE约为15%。

And this isn’t in the table above, but worth repeating:

还有一些没有在表中，但依然值得再强调一遍的：

-   **WFC book value compounded at 11.1% since 1972**
-   **WFC stock price compounded at 11.4% since 1972** (not including dividends)
-   **WFC earnings power compounded at 11.7% since 1972**

* 自1972年以来，富国银行的每股账面价值复合增长率为11.1%；
* 自1972年以来，富国银行的股票价格复合增长率（不考虑股息）为11.4%；
* 自1972年以来，富国银行的盈利能力复合增长率为11.7%。

You’ll also notice that in most years, it retained 2/3rd of its earnings and paid out the other 1/3rd in dividends. So I’m using some back of the envelope thinking here and simply saying that the reinvestment rate is the level of earnings Wells Fargo has to allocate after paying dividends _(note: some of these earnings could be used for buybacks, acquisitions, etc…)._ 

你还会注意到，在大多数年份中，富国银行留存了2/3的当期收益，并将另外1/3的收益以股息的形式返还给了股东。我粗略地想了一下，简单来说，再投资率就是富国银行在支付股息后必须要进行配置的收益比例（注：其中一部分收益可以用于回购、收购资产等等）。

Remember the back of the envelope math:

请记得这个简化公式：

-   **A business will compound at the product of two factors:**
    -   The percentage of earnings it can retain and reinvest
    -   The rate of return it can achieve on that incremental investment

**一个企业价值的复合增长率等于两个因素的乘积：**

- 可以用于留存及再投资的利润占比；
- 这部分增量投资所能实现的回报率。

So it’s just the ROIC times the percentage of earnings it can reinvest (aka the reinvestment rate). In the example of Wells Fargo, I used equity capital (and thus, ROE), and the growth of book value as a proxy for the growth of intrinsic value.

也就是等于ROIC乘以它可以再投资的利润占比（即再投资率）。在富国银行的例子中，我使用了权益资本（也即ROE）和账面价值增长率（代表内在价值增长率）两个指标。

> By the way, you could also look at ROA, which might be a better way to compare core earning power of the bank. However, I wanted to look at ROE in this case since we are buying the equity when we buy the stock and we accept the given amount of leverage (ROE = ROA x Leverage).
> 
> Also, ROE  averages over a long period of time (less dividends) is a good back of the envelope way to eyeball the growth in book value. And for a company like Wells Fargo, **this long term compounding of net worth will approximately move in lock step with intrinsic value growth—and also stock price compounding**… again, over a long period of time.
> 
> As an interesting side note, Wells Fargo carries less than half the leverage in 2014 than it did in 1972. In any event, we’ll compare the returns on equity capital to see how shareholder capital compounded over time.

> 顺便说一下，你也可以使用ROA，在比较银行核心盈利能力时，ROA是更好的指标。但是在这个例子中，我还是想用ROE，因为我们在购买股票时购买的是股权，而且杠杆率是给定的，我们无法改变（ROE = ROA x 杠杆率）。
> 
> 此外，长期的平均净资产收益率（扣除股息）也是观察账面价值增长率的一个简洁明了的指标。而对于富国银行这样的公司来说，**净资产的长期复合增长将与内在价值的增长以及股票价格的复合增长大致同步**……再次强调，是在很长的一段时间内。
> 
> 值得一提的是，富国银行2014年的杠杆率还不到1972年的一半。无论如何，我们将只比较净资产收益率，看看股东资本是如何随着时间的推移而复利增长的。

**So as you can see: 15% ROE and 66% Reinvestment Rate = 10% Intrinsic Value (Book Value) CAGR.** 

**所以正如你看到的那样，15%的ROE x 66%的再投资率 = 10%的内在价值（账面价值）年化复合增长率。**

You’ll notice it’s not exact, as book value compounded at 11%, and this back of the envelope math suggests book value will compound at 10%. The difference has to do with the aggregate effects of things like share buybacks/issuances, dividends, acquisitions, etc… but the basic idea should demonstrate that a business like Wells Fargo that can produce 15% returns on equity capital will grow the value of its net worth and earning power by 10% or so if it can reinvest 2/3rds of its earnings at that rate of return.

你会注意到结果并不准确，因为账面价值的复合增长率是11%，而简化公式的结果显示账面价值的复合增长率是10%。这种差异受到股票回购/发行、股息、收购等方面的综合影响。但基本的思路是：像富国银行这样的企业，如果能将其2/3的收益进行再投资，并且股权资本回报率能达到15%，那么其净资产价值和盈利能力将会以10%的速度增长。

Note: I went back to 1972 just for fun. You don’t need to wait 42 years. I also looked at the 1974, the 1984, and the 1994 numbers, which would have provided very similar results, thanks to the incredibly consistent returns on equity.

说明：我以1972年作为起点只是为了让讨论更加有趣。你不需要真的等42年。我还研究了1974年、1984年和1994年的数据，结果都非常相似，这要归功于富国银行令人难以置信的稳定的ROE水平。

Now, every time I post about a company with a long history of success, I get emails or comments about cherry picking, or the more sophisticated academic term: “confirmation bias” or “survivorship bias” (or something like that).

现在，每当我发布文章讨论关于有着悠久成功历史的公司时，我都会收到指出我在”采樱桃“（一种谬误，指单方论证或隐瞒证据）的Email或者评论。”采樱桃“用更复杂的学术术语来说，也叫”确认偏差“或者”幸存者偏差“（或类似的东西）。

The point here is not to say that WFC is a good investment now or a good company now just because it has done well in the past.

这里的重点不是说富国银行现在是一个好的投资标的，也不是说仅仅因为它过去做得很好现在就是一家好公司。

The point is to simply look at the math…

重点是简洁明了地理解那个公式。

# High Returns on Incremental Investments Leads to Compounding Value 增量投资的高回报率会产生复利价值

And the math tells you that if you can locate a company that is producing attractive returns on its incremental capital, and your analysis of the business tells you that it has enough reinvestment opportunities that it will continue to be able to produce those returns going forward, then you will likely have a company that will compound at an above average rate.

这个公式表明，如果你能找到一家公司，它的增量资本能产生有吸引力的回报，而且基于你对这家公司的分析，你知道它有足够的再投资机会，可以持续创造这样的回报，那么你可能会拥有一家将以高于平均速度复合增长的公司。

Wells Fargo was able to compound value for shareholders over decades because they were able to consistently reinvest sizable portions of retained earnings at attractive returns on equity.

富国银行之所以能够在几十年内为股东创造复利价值，是因为它们能够持续地将相当大一部分留存收益以具有吸引力的投资收益率进行再投资。

Of course, this is just the math. The real work is handicapping each situation and being able to analyze and evaluate businesses. But the concept is important, and despite all that has been written about it, I think many people miss the concept, which puts them immediately behind in the count.

当然，上面列示的只是数学计算。真实的工作是评估每一种情况，并能够对企业进行分析和评估。但是这个概念是很重要的。尽管已经有很多关于它的文章，但我认为很多人都忽略了这个概念，这会让他们的投资业绩不尽如人意。

# A Clue in Determining if a Business Can Continue Producing High Returns 判断一个企业能否继续创造高回报的思路

You might ask: How does one determine if attractive returns in the past will lead to attractive returns in the future? One reason I inserted the Buffett quote from the 1987 shareholder report is that he provides a very valuable clue: **It helps to locate a business that will likely be doing the same thing in 5-10 years that it’s doing now.**

你可能会问：如何确定过去的诱人回报是否会导致未来的诱人回报？我在文章开头引用巴菲特1987年致股东信的一个原因就在于，他提供了一个非常有价值的思路：**寻找这样一种生意，它在5-10年内可能会做和现在一样的事情。**

In 2009, Blackberry was producing incredibly high returns on invested capital–around 40%. But the problem is that in 2014, Blackberry is a completely different business with different products than it was in 2009. And in 2009, it would have been very hard to predict what 2014 would look like for Blackberry. Similarly, Apple is producing incredible returns in 2014, and they have a great business. But I don’t know what products Apple will be selling 10 years from now. My guess is that they will still have cool products and they will still be a great company, but it’s hard to value a business when you don’t know what they will be selling in 10 years.

2009年，黑莓（Blackberry）的投资资本回报率高得惊人：大约40%。但问题是，到了2014年，黑莓无论是业务还是产品都与2009年完全不同。而在2009年的时候，人们很难预测黑莓在2014年会是什么样子。同样，苹果公司（Apple）在2014年也创造了惊人的回报，他们有一个伟大的业务。但我不知道10年后苹果会卖什么产品。我猜他们仍然会有很酷的产品，他们仍然会是一个伟大的公司，但是当你不知道他们在10年后会卖什么的时候，就很难评估一个企业的价值。

But it would have been fairly easy to predict in 2004 that Wells Fargo would likely be taking in low cost deposits and lending them out in 2014. They were doing this 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100 years ago. You wouldn’t have needed to know about the crash, the credit bubble, or the massive economic recession… just that the business you’re evaluating is durable and has survived various “real life stress tests” before, and that in 10 years, you’ll be able to close your eyes and picture what kind of business the company will be doing. Once you can reasonable predict what the company will be doing, then you can determine price, valuation, how much to pay, etc…

但在2004年，要预测富国银行2014年的情况是相对容易的：它可能会吸收低成本的存款并将其贷出。因为在5年、10年、20年、50年和100年前，他们就已经在做这样的事了。你不需要知道崩溃、信贷泡沫或大规模的经济衰退……你只需要知道你正在评估的企业是可持续经营的，并经受住了以前各种的“现实生活压力测试”，你就可以闭上眼睛，想象公司10年后将做什么样的业务。一旦你能合理地预测公司将要做什么，那么你就可以确定价格、估值、以及你要在什么价格买入等等。

We can discuss more on this in future posts… the point here is that it’s important to understand that a business that produces attractive returns on the capital it employs will produce value over time.

我们可以在以后的文章中对此进行更多的讨论……这里的重点是，要理解一个企业如果能使其投入资本获得有吸引力的回报率，那么它将随着时间的推移产生价值。


_**Disclosure**: John Huber owns warrants to buy Wells Fargo common stock for his own account and accounts he manages for clients. This is not a recommendation. Please conduct your own research._ 

**信息披露**：John Huber 在自营和客户资管账户中持有富国银行普通股的认购权证。本文不构成投资建议，请自行研究决策。

[^1987]:原文写成1992年，应该是写错了，这段话见于1987年的股东信


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_John Huber is the founder of [Saber Capital Management, LLC.](https://sabercapitalmgt.com/) Saber is the general partner and manager of an investment fund modeled after the original Buffett partnerships. Saber’s strategy is to make very carefully selected investments in undervalued stocks of great businesses._ 

_John can be reached at [john@sabercapitalmgt.com.](mailto:john@sabercapitalmgt.com)_