原文信息： - 链接：[PDF](https://www.mcmadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Martin-Capital-Management-2022-Annual-Report.pdf) - 中文翻译参考：Deepl - 整合：Terrellchen，Ponge --- # Martin Capital Management 2022 Annual Report > “It is a fact of experience, that when the interest of money is two per cent, capital habitually emigrates, or, what is here the same thing, is wasted on foolish speculations, which never yield any adequate return.” > > "经验告诉我们，当货币利率为 2% 时，资本就会习惯性地外流，或者，也就是浪费在愚蠢的投机活动上，而这些投机活动永远不会产生足够的回报"。 > > –Walter Bagehot (1848) > > 沃尔特-贝格霍特（1848 年） > “Philosophy cannot exist without criticism, and writing makes it possible and convenient to subject thought to a continuous and concentrated scrutiny. Writing freezes speech and in so doing gives birth to the grammarian, the logician, the rhetorician, the historian, the scientist—all those who must hold language before them so that they can see what it means, where it errs, and where it is leading.” > > "没有批判，哲学就不可能存在，而写作使思想接受持续而集中的审视成为可能和便利。写作使言语凝固，从而产生了语法学家、逻辑学家、修辞学家、历史学家和科学家--所有这些人都必须掌握语言，才能看清它的含义、它的错误和它的走向"。 > > –Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death (1985) > > 尼尔-波兹曼，《娱乐至死》（1985 年） > “To lose patience is to lose the battle.” > > "失去耐心就会输掉战斗"。 > > –Mahatma Gandhi (1915) > > 圣雄甘地（1915 年） > “To this moment most economists, businessmen and government officials obstinately regard inflation not as the structural vulnerability of contemporary capitalism but rather as the accidental result of unlucky coincidences requiring only patience, time (and unemployment) for its alleviation.” > > "直到现在，大多数经济学家、商人和政府官员仍然顽固地认为，通货膨胀不是当代资本主义的结构性弱点，而是不幸巧合的偶然结果，只需要耐心、时间（和失业）就能缓解"。 > > –Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (1974) > > 小阿瑟-施莱辛格（1974 年） For further information, contact Client Relations at [ClientRelations@mcmadvisors.com](mailto:ClientRelations@mcmadvisors.com) --- Dear Client: 亲爱的客户 # Performance Summary 业绩摘要 The S&P 500 had a total return of -18.32% for 2022 after rallying +7.56% in the fourth quarter. Because of MCM’s defensive posture, a representative client account invested in our model portfolio was flat for the year after fees, and gained approximately 2% on a total return basis in the fourth quarter. Index put-option positions, which may appreciate significantly in a major market drawdown, detracted from the otherwise positive performance courtesy of equity positions. Individual performance varies. Please find your personal quarterly performance at the bottom of the Asset Reconciliation in your statement packet. 标准普尔 500 指数在第四季度上涨 7.56%，2022 年的总回报率为-18.32%。由于 MCM 采取了防御态势，投资于我们的模型投资组合的代表性客户账户在扣除费用后的全年收益持平，第四季度的总回报率约为 2%。指数看跌期权头寸在市场大幅缩水时可能会大幅升值，这使得股票头寸的积极表现大打折扣。个人业绩各不相同。请在对账单中的 "资产对账单 "底部查看您的个人季度业绩。 # Market summary 市场总结 The down year in equities, the worst since 2008, caught most investors and managers off guard. No less surprising was the sorry performance of the tech darlings that had turbocharged portfolio gains over the last decade. 自 2008 年以来最糟糕的一年，股票市场的下跌令大多数投资者和经理人措手不及。同样令人惊讶的是，在过去十年中为投资组合带来巨大收益的科技宠儿的表现却令人遗憾。 The acronymic leader of the FANG stocks, Meta (formerly Facebook) is a case in point. Its five-year chart reveals the ephemeral evanescence of gains detached from valuation. At its November lows, Meta sold at 25% of its November 2021 highs, stunning technophilic retail investors and passive indexers alike. FANG 股票中的佼佼者 Meta（前身为 Facebook）就是一个典型的例子。其五年走势图显示，脱离估值的收益昙花一现。在 11 月的低点，Meta的售价仅为 2021 年 11 月高点的 25%，令技术派散户投资者和被动指数投资者都大跌眼镜。 ![](../Elements/Frank_Martin/Figure1.png) _Figure 1 Meta (formerly Facebook), 2018–present_ Meta is not an outlier. All told, the original FANG—Facebook, Apple, Netflix, and Google, along with recent additions like Amazon and Tesla—have cast a pox, much like the Nifty Fifty of the early 1970s, on the “growth at any price” dogma. Meta 并非个例。总而言之，最初的 FANG--Facebook、苹果、Netflix 和谷歌，以及最近加入的亚马逊和特斯拉--就像 20 世纪 70 年代初的 Nifty Fifty 一样，给 "不惜代价实现增长 "的信条画上了一个句号。 ||Peak Price
峰值|Year-end
年末|Percentage Change
百分比变化 ---|---:|---:|---: Meta (Facebook)|$385|$120|-69% Apple|$182|$130|-29% Netflix|$700|$294|-58% Google|$151|$88|-42% Tesla has been the poster child of the new investing era. For years, investors simply trusted that sufficient earnings would materialize for the company in the future to justify the stock price. Not unlike the self-driving car, Tesla’s outlandish earnings growth expectations are being pushed farther and farther into the future. A true signal that valuation matters again is that Tesla actually has increased production and profits in the last year. Still, its stock price cannot maintain the irrationality priced into its peak (Figure 2). 特斯拉一直是新投资时代的典型代表。多年来，投资者只是相信公司未来会有足够的盈利来证明股价的合理性。类似于自动驾驶汽车，特斯拉离奇的盈利增长预期正被越推越远。去年，特斯拉的产量和利润实际上都有所增长，这才是估值重新变得重要的真正信号。尽管如此，其股价仍无法维持峰值时的非理性价格。 The decline represents a re-evaluation of a diminished future. It’s a shift in psychology and narrative. The mantra used to be that Tesla was a tech company, not an auto manufacturer. Tech-company valuation, so the thinking went, defies logic because the radical change they sell has almost inestimable profit potential. The future Tesla presaged, so the argument went, justified its valuation. The company created unique products (unseen in the marketplace) that would fundamentally reorganize our lives—namely, the integration of solar shingles, electric cars, and home battery packs. Today the narrative has rapidly evolved to something different. We hear that every major auto brand is launching an electric model. These mature businesses have vastly greater experience in scaling production. Their designs differ andoffer both the product features and brand stories necessary to break the consumer loyalty cult to Tesla. 股价下跌代表了对未来渺茫的重新评估。这是心理和叙事的转变。过去，特斯拉是一家科技公司，而不是汽车制造商。这种观点认为，科技公司的估值违背逻辑，因为它们销售的激进变革几乎具有不可估量的盈利潜力。这种观点认为，特斯拉预示的未来证明了其估值的合理性。该公司创造了独特的产品（市场上从未见过），将从根本上改变我们的生活--即太阳能瓦片、电动汽车和家用电池组的整合。如今，这种说法已迅速演变为另一种说法。我们听说各大汽车品牌都在推出电动车型。这些成熟的企业在扩大生产规模方面拥有丰富的经验。它们的设计各不相同，并提供了打破消费者对特斯拉的忠诚崇拜所必需的产品功能和品牌故事。 ![](../Elements/Frank_Martin/Figure2.png) _Figure 2 Tesla share price (white), units shipped (blue)_ Tesla has never had the high margins and network capabilities of a software firm. But even if it did, they would not have been enough to support the faulty assumptions of the growth investors buying at the peak of the cycle. The implosion of the FANG stocks demonstrates that true tech companies and those who rode their coattails are all eventually subject to the rules of value. Stories to the contrary are just tall tales. 特斯拉从来没有软件公司那样的高利润和网络能力。但即使有，也不足以支撑增长型投资者在周期顶峰时买入的错误假设。FANG 股票的内爆表明，真正的科技公司和那些追随它们的投资者最终都要服从价值规律。与此相反的故事都是无稽之谈。 # Miscreants at the Fed 美联储的奸商 The catalyst for this shift toward rationality surely lies largely at the feet of the Federal Reserve, aided by the U.S. Congress. The central bank has finally ratcheted up its benchmark interest rate off the zero-bound, raising it faster than in any previous period of its history. The 1970s saw greater absolute increases to the Fed funds rate, but in terms of duration risk, the losses on bonds bought near zero are markedly greater. The Fed funds rate is one mechanism through which the Fed conducts monetary policy, and the rate went from essentially zero to 4.25% since mid-March 2022. Over the same period, the yield on the two-year and 10-year Treasury bonds levitated in harmony. The two-year surged from 1.3% to 4.3%, and the 10-year went from 1.8% to 3.6%. The spread between these two instruments inverted midsummer 2022 and has remained so. This phenomenon is a predictable precursor of recessions. 在美国国会的帮助下，美联储无疑是这一理性转变的催化剂。美联储终于将基准利率从零界点上调了上来，其上调速度超过了历史上任何时期。20 世纪 70 年代，美联储基金利率的绝对增幅更大，但就久期风险而言，在零附近购买债券的损失明显更大。美联储基金利率是美联储实施货币政策的机制之一，自 2022 年 3 月中旬以来，该利率从基本为零升至 4.25%。在同一时期，两年期和 10 年期国债的收益率也在和谐地波动。两年期国债收益率从 1.3% 飙升至 4.3%，10 年期国债收益率从 1.8% 升至 3.6%。这两种债券之间的利差在 2022 年仲夏出现了倒挂，并一直保持至今。这种现象是经济衰退的可预见前兆。 As 2022 wore on, overpriced stocks declined, unaccustomed to competition from a significant, risk-free yield on securities of the U.S. Treasury. Further, the scent of recession in the air stoked legitimate concerns of an impending decline in corporate earnings. These were the nails in the coffins of companies like Tesla, whose earnings were far in the distance but baked into the cake that investors had to eat today. The indigestion from the downsized value of those earnings expectations, to say nothing of the market’s decline, has cast an eerie pall over the whole tech universe. Index funds, as well as the many closet indexers that fly the flag of active management, have found themselves adrift as the winds of fortune turned against them. 随着 2022 年的到来，定价过高的股票因不适应来自美国国库券的巨大无风险收益率的竞争而下跌。此外，空气中弥漫的经济衰退气息也加剧了人们对企业盈利即将下滑的合理担忧。这些都是特斯拉等公司的致命伤，它们的盈利虽然遥遥无期，但却是投资者今天不得不吃的蛋糕。这些盈利预期价值缩水带来的消化不良，更不用说市场的下跌了，给整个科技领域蒙上了一层阴森恐怖的阴影。指数基金，以及许多打着主动管理旗号的 "衣柜 "指数投资者，都发现自己在逆风中漂泊。 Rising rates also mean that, mathematically, bond prices decline, with duration and quality determining just how much. The result was kryptonite for the traditional 60/40 portfolio. The inverse correlation of bonds to equities broke down. Absent that saving grace, bonds could offer no counterbalance to falling stock prices in 2022. 从数学上讲，利率上升也意味着债券价格下降，而期限和质量决定了下降的幅度。这对传统的 60/40 投资组合来说是 "氪石"。债券与股票的反向相关性被打破。如果没有这个救命稻草，债券在 2022 年就无法抵消股票价格的下跌。 ![](../Elements/Frank_Martin/Figure3.png) _Figure 3 S&P 500 (white), U.S. recessions (blue shaded bars), Fed funds rate (purple), Year-over-year inflation (yellow)_ It was nearly five decades ago in the mid-1970s when markets last experienced a comparably sharp spike in the Fed funds rate. In the major bear markets since the 1980s—all coincided with recessions—the Fed began easing rates immediately. The mid-’70s and early 2020s, however, share a common exogenous threat that could presage the developments in this cycle—inflation. The deep recession of 1973–75 seemingly forced the hand of then Fed Chairman Arthur Burns, and the fight to quell inflation was abandoned. By 1976 a more virulent inflation was back, and it took the new strong-willed Fed chairman Paul Volcker, along with two back-to-back recessions, to finally slay the inflation dragon. 上一次市场经历类似的美联储基金利率大幅飙升是在近五十年前的 20 世纪 70 年代中期。在 20 世纪 80 年代以来的主要熊市中，美联储都是在经济衰退的同时立即开始放松利率。然而，70 年代中期和 2020 年代初有一个共同的外生威胁，可能预示着本轮周期的发展--通胀。1973-75 年的严重衰退似乎迫使时任美联储主席阿瑟-伯恩斯（Arthur Burns）出手，放弃了抑制通货膨胀的斗争。到了 1976 年，更猛烈的通胀卷土重来，新任美联储主席保罗-沃尔克（Paul Volcker）意志坚强，加上连续两次经济衰退，才最终杀死了通胀之龙。 During the 10 years beginning in the spring of 1972, the consumer-price index rose from 41 to 98—or 139%. Thus $1.00 in 1982 purchased only $0.41 of the same goods and services that consumers bought in 1972. In the last two and half years, CPI has risen from 256 to 298, an increase of a comparatively modest 16.4%. If the monetary initiatives to contain the current bout of inflation are aborted before the scourge is contained, the economic and social consequences are likely to be severe. If economic conditions worsen and markets decline, the Fed will be forced to choose between staying the course against inflation or attending to the economic malaise. 从 1972 年春天开始的 10 年间，消费价格指数从 41% 上升到 98%，即 139%。因此，1982 年的 1 美元只能购买到 1972 年消费者购买的 0.41 美元的商品和服务。在过去的两年半里，消费物价指数从 256 升至 298，增幅相对较小，仅为 16.4%。如果遏制当前通胀的货币措施在这一祸害得到控制之前就被中止，那么经济和社会后果很可能是严重的。如果经济状况恶化，市场下滑，美联储将被迫在坚持应对通胀与应对经济萎靡之间做出选择。 In the early days of 2023, investors continue to wonder whether the Fed will be faced with such a choice. Namely, is the 12-month bear market largely contained, or is there another shoe to drop? In the last century there have only been four instances of back-to-back years of stock market losses, so many take hope. Notably, however, those instances were 1929–32, 1939–41, 1973–75, and 2000–02. They played out against the backdrop of the Great Depression, World War II, the 1970s oil crisis, and the bursting of the dot.com bubble, respectively. As is conspicuous below, declines in the second year were always deeper than the first. These were no ordinary bear markets; they were the grizzlies capable of seriously mauling accumulated wealth. 在 2023 年初，投资者仍在猜测美联储是否会面临这样的选择。也就是说，为期 12 个月的熊市是否已基本得到遏制，还是会有另一只鞋子掉下来？在上个世纪，只有四次出现股市连续数年下跌的情况，因此很多人抱有希望。但值得注意的是，这四次分别是 1929-32、1939-41、1973-75 和 2000-02。它们分别是在大萧条、第二次世界大战、20 世纪 70 年代石油危机和互联网泡沫破灭的背景下发生的。如下图所示，第二年的跌幅总是大于第一年。这些都不是普通的熊市；它们是能够严重破坏累积财富的灰熊。
Year
年		Percent Decline
下降百分比
Great Depression1929-11.90%
*1930-28.50%
1931-47.00%
1932-15.50%
World War II1939-5.50%
*1940-15.30%
1941-17.90%
Oil Embargo1973-17.40%
*1974-29.70%
Dot.com Bubble2000-10.10%
*2001-13.00%
2002-23.30%
\* Second year of major bear markets always had larger declines than the first. 大熊市的第二年总是比第一年跌幅更大。 If the decline of 2022 does prove to be the first leg of a mighty bear market, will the Fed loosen policy? Should it loosen policy? If it does, will inflation return with a vengeance? How can a repeat of the 1970s be avoided with the least amount of human suffering? The choices before the Fed are unenviable. They are also self-inflicted. The warnings against the central bank’s policy have been long and loud. Though wealth management’s time horizon is intergenerational, it is practiced day to day. We must face the complex challenges of the bizarre macroeconomic landscape the world faces. We are quite aware that we could misjudge the future actions of the Fed. That is why we don’t play the prognostication game. Our methodology has remained consistent despite the machinations of monetary policy. As interest rates, QE(quantitative easing), future technological success, and any number of other variables are largely unknown, we remain grounded in the discipline of valuation as the overarching criterion for investment. And it has a reliable track record of enduring the worst that the market has thrown at investors. 如果 2022 年的下跌确实被证明是强大熊市的第一段，美联储会放松政策吗？是否应该放松政策？如果放宽政策，通货膨胀是否会卷土重来？如何避免重蹈 20 世纪 70 年代的覆辙，同时尽可能减少人类的痛苦？摆在美联储面前的选择是不值得羡慕的。它们也是自找的。针对央行政策的警告由来已久，而且声音很大。虽然财富管理的时间跨度是跨代的，但它的实践却是日复一日的。我们必须面对复杂的挑战，面对世界所面临的奇异的宏观经济格局。我们非常清楚，我们可能会对美联储未来的行动做出错误判断。这就是我们不玩预言游戏的原因。尽管货币政策机关算尽，但我们的方法始终如一。由于利率、量化宽松政策（QE）、未来的技术成就以及其他变量在很大程度上都是未知的，因此我们仍然将估值作为投资的首要标准。这也是我们的投资原则，它有着可靠的记录，能够经受住市场给投资者带来的最坏影响。 # Where have we been …? 我们在哪里......？ MCM stays within the realm of the comparatively knowable, seeking solid businesses that are valued by the market at a price that implies a generous margin of safety. A well-managed business that is conservatively capitalized, is producing an essential product, and can be purchased below its intrinsic value meets our requirements. These are the characteristics that our partners at Palm Valley seek when adding names to the portfolio we manage for clients at MCM. As these companies address macro issues at the micro level, the need to judge the direction of the economic winds is somewhat alleviated. MCM 坚持在相对可知的范围内，寻找被市场估价为具有较大安全边际的稳健企业。管理良好、资本保守、生产重要产品、可以以低于其内在价值的价格购买的企业符合我们的要求。这些都是我们在棕榈谷的合作伙伴在为 MCM 客户管理的投资组合中增加投资品种时所寻求的特征。由于这些公司能在微观层面上解决宏观问题，因此判断经济风向的必要性在一定程度上得到了缓解。 We have sung this song of valuation for decades—such that it can sound trite, tired, or repetitive, especially when investors are losing their heads as assets prices spiral to dizzying heights. The tune, lest we forget, resonates with history. Classics can be familiar, but they ultimately age well. To hear it with fresh ears, we must take stock of where the market has been and how shrill a jingle it has been singing in recent years. 几十年来，我们一直在唱这首估值之歌--以至于它听起来有些老套、乏味或重复，尤其是当资产价格飙升到令人眼花缭乱的高度时，投资者更是失去了理智。但我们不要忘记，这首曲子与历史同频共振。经典可能耳熟能详，但终究会历久弥新。要想以全新的耳朵聆听这首曲子，我们必须回顾一下近年来市场的发展状况，以及它所唱的这首曲子有多么刺耳。 When markets have fallen during the Fed’s easy-money regime of recent decades, the formula for success has been to buy the dip. Investors who bought the dips of 2022 learned, for the first time in years, that the efficacy of the Pavlovian response is context-dependent. Careers have been built on trusting the Fed to bail out poor decision-making. That may yet be the ending, but losses prior to the pivot can be so destabilizing that the propensity to take even reasonable risks is crippled, and paper losses become permanent ones. 近几十年来，当市场在美联储宽松货币政策下下跌时，成功的方法就是逢低买入。在 2022 年股市大跌时买入股票的投资者多年来第一次认识到，巴甫洛夫反应的效力取决于具体情况。人们的职业生涯建立在相信美联储会为糟糕的决策纾困的基础上。这可能是结局，但在转向之前的损失可能是如此不稳定，以至于承担合理风险的倾向被削弱，账面损失成为永久性损失。 There will assuredly come a time to buy stocks aggressively, but the herald of its arrival is not just a downturn in the index. The peak of a bubble holds very little meaningful information, and the same applies to a retreat from that apex. Rather, the time to buy is when price-to-value dynamics become compelling. While the ultimate arbiter of that equation is the meticulous parsing of financial statements and business structures, almost equally telling is the broad shift in investor confidence. We are firm believers in mean reversion, and the most conspicuous reversion after the euphoric inflating of a stock bubble is the change in investor psychology. The same shares so beloved months earlier on the prospect of perpetual earnings growth are suddenly deemed untouchable despite selling at bargain prices. Crowds often think as one; the arrival of attractive stock valuations will invariably be accompanied by collective despair about the market’s future. 肯定会有积极买入股票的时候，但预示其到来的不仅仅是指数的下滑。泡沫的顶峰并不能提供多少有意义的信息，从顶峰回落也是如此。相反，买入的时机是当价格对价值的动态变得有吸引力时。虽然对财务报表和业务结构的细致分析是这一等式的最终仲裁者，但投资者信心的广泛转变几乎同样能说明问题。我们坚信均值回归，而股票泡沫膨胀后最明显的回归就是投资者心理的变化。几个月前，同样的股票因盈利持续增长的前景而备受青睐，而现在，这些股票尽管以低廉的价格出售，却突然被认为是不可触碰的。人群的思维往往是一致的；诱人的股票估值的到来必然伴随着对市场未来的集体绝望。 To understand just how impressive the peak in the market has been, we will re-examine the winds behind its sails: the deluge of money coming courtesy of the U.S. government. The top half of Figure 4 shows the S&P 500 index (white) along with its trailing 12-month EPS (earnings per share, blue). The white line led the movement of the blue as investors anticipated the surge in earnings. The index led the charge asearnings veritably levitated into the recovery from the COVID shutdowns. The middle part of the chart shows why. 要想了解市场的顶峰有多令人印象深刻，我们将重新审视其背后的风向：美国政府提供的大量资金。图 4 的上半部分显示了标准普尔 500 指数（白色）及其 12 个月的 EPS（每股收益，蓝色）。由于投资者预期盈利将激增，白线引领了蓝线的走势。随着 COVID 停产后的复苏，收益也随之上升，指数也随之上升。图表中间部分说明了原因。 ![](../Elements/Frank_Martin/Figure4.png) _Figure 4 Top: S&P 500 (white), trailing 12-month earnings (blue). Middle: Fed balance sheet (orange), Federal budget/surplus as a percentage of GDP (yellow). Bottom: Price-to-earnings ratio (purple), price-to-10-year-average-earnings ratio (teal)_ The orange line is the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. As markets crashed in 2020, the Fed flooded commercial banks with liquidity, doubling its assets through QE. We have written at length about the asset-price inflation that results from QE. Its suppression of long-term interest rates, ceteris paribus,results in risk assets selling at higher prices, despite their cash flows remaining unchanged. 橙色线是美联储的资产负债表。2020 年市场崩溃时，美联储向商业银行注入了大量流动性，通过量化宽松将其资产增加了一倍。我们曾详细论述过量化宽松导致的资产价格膨胀。尽管风险资产的现金流保持不变，但美联储压低长期利率的做法会导致风险资产以更高的价格出售。 It wasn’t just prices that rose, however. Earnings followed. The yellow is the size of the U.S. federal deficit as a percentage of GDP. Its increase in 2020, shown as a decline on the chart, represents federal deficit spending moving from 5% of GDP to more than 18%. Congress approved massive deficits, which function as new money in the hands of consumers. Stimulus payments cushioned the demand-vacuum shock by shoring up consumer spending. The largess trickled up to corporate America, contributingmightily to the surge in S&P earnings. 然而，上涨的不仅仅是价格。收益也随之上升。黄色是美国联邦赤字规模占国内生产总值的百分比。2020 年的增长在图表中显示为下降，表明联邦赤字支出占 GDP 的比例从 5% 上升到 18% 以上。美国国会批准了巨额赤字，赤字就像消费者手中的新货币。刺激性支付通过支撑消费者支出来缓冲需求真空带来的冲击。这些慷慨的资金流向了美国企业界，极大地推动了标普公司盈利的飙升。 The resurgent, post-COVID bull market that appears to have peaked in January 2022 was largely the result of two complementary forces from the same source. Public support from the Fed and the Treasury, in the form of massive monetary and fiscal stimulus, is reflected in the spiking price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios in the third panel (teal and purple). Monetary policy juiced stock prices. Fiscal policy inflated earnings. The result was multiple expansion. The purple line is the P/E ratio using trailing 12-month earnings. The teal line is a proxy for the cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio and shows the true magnitude of the bubble. It was the subject of last year’s annual report. The metric has reliably tracked the aggregate value of the S&P 500 for more than 100 years. It peaked at 37 in August 2021. It now sits at 28. Its long-term average is 17.3. Perhaps analogous to pendulums, the average CAPE is often a waypoint in major bear markets. COVID 后牛市的复苏似乎已在 2022 年 1 月达到顶峰，这在很大程度上是来自同一来源的两股互补力量的结果。美联储和财政部以大规模货币和财政刺激政策的形式提供的公共支持，反映在第三幅图（茶色和紫色）中飙升的市盈率上。货币政策刺激了股票价格。财政政策抬高了收益。结果是多重扩张。紫色线是使用追踪 12 个月盈利计算的市盈率。茶色线是周期性调整市盈率（CAPE）的代表，显示了泡沫的真实规模。这是去年年度报告的主题。100 多年来，该指标一直可靠地跟踪标普 500 指数的总价值。它在 2021 年 8 月达到 37 的峰值。目前为 28。其长期平均值为 17.3。也许与钟摆类似，平均 CAPE 通常是主要熊市的一个路标。 While we prefer CAPE earnings for identifying long-term trends in the market, current earnings are useful for examining the present cycle. Though multiples have retreated somewhat, S&P 500 annual earnings have yet to materially decline. They were dropping throughout 2022, but they shrank only 12%, back to the level of August 2021. In 2009 earnings plummeted 90%. That was a remarkable example, though. Still, the muted economic pain after the 2000 dot-com bubble saw earnings fall more than 50%. Given the lags in monetary policy, it’s likely the economy is just beginning to feel the pain. Therefore, we find plenty of room for continued multiple contraction. Bear markets [move in stages](https://frank-k-martin.com/2022/09/07/the-taxonomy-of-bear-markets/), and 2022 appears to us to be the first act. 虽然我们更倾向于用 CAPE 收益来确定市场的长期趋势，但当前的收益对于研究当前的周期也很有用。尽管市盈率有所回落，但标准普尔 500 指数的年度盈利尚未出现实质性下降。整个 2022 年，盈利都在下降，但只缩水了 12%，回到了 2021 年 8 月的水平。2009 年，收益暴跌 90%。不过，这是一个非凡的例子。然而，在 2000 年网络泡沫之后的经济低迷时期，企业盈利的跌幅也超过了 50%。鉴于货币政策的滞后性，经济可能才刚刚开始感受到痛苦。因此，我们认为多重收缩仍有很大的空间。熊市是分阶段进行的，在我们看来，2022 年是第一阶段。 We consider ourselves well-positioned for what lies ahead. With a small allocation to undervalued businesses, a well-distributed put position over the next 12 months, and plenty of cash earning 4% in U.S. Treasuries while we await greater price-to-value propositions in individual equities, our portfolios are structured to weather ’most any storm. We want our clients to sleep well—and to ultimately eat well financially. By minimizing the effect of negative volatility in bubble markets and seeking positive volatility during the inevitable aftermath, we have eschewed the widely embraced high-risk, high-return paradigm. We believe that this strategy will continue to serve all of us well. 我们认为自己已经为未来做好了充分准备。我们在被低估的企业中配置了少量资金，在未来12个月里分配了合理的看跌头寸，并在等待个别股票的更高性价比时，我们在美国国债上投入了大量现金，收益率为4%，因此我们的投资组合能够经受 "绝大多数风暴"。我们希望客户睡得好，最终吃得好。通过最大限度地减少泡沫市场中负面波动的影响，并在不可避免的后果中寻求正面波动，我们摒弃了广为接受的高风险、高回报模式。我们相信，这一策略将继续为我们大家服务。 # Final thoughts … 最后的想法 It has been 56 years since I exchanged my naval officer’s uniform for a coat and tie to pursue a career as a professional investor and fiduciary. The challenge and responsibility of overseeing the wealth of others who have placed their trust in me was both daunting and exhilarating. Many of the relationships borne out of those professional bonds have grown into lifelong friendships. 自从我换下海军军官制服，穿上大衣、打上领带，开始职业投资者和信托人的生涯以来，已经过去了 56 年。管理那些信任我的人的财富，这种挑战和责任既令人生畏，又令人振奋。许多源于这些职业纽带的关系已经发展成为终身的友谊。 Lane Miller and Kristen Smith-Myers, my associates and the operational lifeblood of MCM, have once again proven their mettle this past year. With each breath I take, I’m reminded that they are the oxygen in MCM’s lungs. 莱恩-米勒（Lane Miller）和克里斯汀-史密斯-迈尔斯（Kristen Smith-Myers）是我的同事，也是 MCM 的经营命脉，他们在过去的一年里再次证明了自己的能力。我的每一次呼吸都提醒我，他们就是 MCM 肺部的氧气。 So it is that I continue to express my gratitude to those who have made my career journey so emotionally rewarding that thoughts of retiring before my mind or body serve notice are rare. While, admittedly, my physical options are limited, there is nothing I’d rather do professionally. Communally, though, there is a world of need crying out to all of us. Unabashedly promotional, I encourage you to click on this Owls Club [link](https://owlsclub.org/) to discover one way of addressing the loneliness epidemic. If you live in Elkhart County, please take the survey and become a member! 因此，我要继续向那些让我的职业生涯充满激情的人表示感谢，这些人让我很少想到在我的身心得到通知之前就退休。诚然，我在身体上的选择有限，但在职业上，我没有什么比这更愿意做的了。但是，从社会的角度来看，我们每个人都需要帮助。在此，我鼓励大家点击猫头鹰俱乐部的链接，了解解决孤独流行病的一种方法。如果您住在埃尔克哈特县，请参与调查并成为会员！ Despite the best-laid plans, serendipity has often interceded in surprisingly constructive ways in my professional life. A chance encounter with Eric Cinnamond years ago, then Jayme Wiggins more recently, ultimately led to my founder’s investment in Palm Valley Capital Management in 2018. Because the three of us are uncannily in sync philosophically, Palm Valley is my, and likely your, succession plan and the reason I sleep so peacefully and have no fear of the investment goblins of the future. 尽管我有最周密的计划，但在我的职业生涯中，偶然性常常以出人意料的建设性方式介入。多年前，我与埃里克-桂皮翁德（Eric Cinnamond）的一次偶遇，以及最近与杰米-维金斯（Jayme Wiggins）的邂逅，最终促成了我的创始人在 2018 年对棕榈谷资本管理公司（Palm Valley Capital Management）的投资。因为我们三人在理念上不谋而合，棕榈谷是我的(很可能也是你的)接班人计划，也是我睡得如此安稳、不怕未来投资恶魔的原因。 Some third-party accolades bear repeating. Jim Grant, among the most respected and admired commentators/writers on Wall Street, is no stranger to readers of these reports. In a September 2022 WEALTHTRACK [interview](https://wealthtrack.com/inflations-damage-financial-consequences-investment-strategies-with-historian-james-grant/) (beginning at 14:18 minutes), Grant uncharacteristically singled out the small-cap equity fund Palm Valley Capital Fund (PVCMX), which holds mainly cash “awaiting the return of valuations at which an unbending, unconventional, uncompromising, value-seeking investor can put other people’s money to work.” Grant also recommended reading the firm’s quarterly letters to shareholders: “some of the best and wittiest financial-markets commentary on the web.” 一些第三方的赞誉值得重复。吉姆-格兰特（Jim Grant）是华尔街最受尊敬和钦佩的评论员/作家之一，对这些报告的读者来说并不陌生。在 2022 年 9 月的一次 WEALTHTRACK 采访中（从 14:18 分钟开始），格兰特一反常态地特别提到了小型股票基金棕榈谷资本基金（PVCMX），该基金主要持有现金，"等待估值回归，在这个时候，一个不屈不挠、不走寻常路、不妥协、追求价值的投资者可以把别人的钱投入使用"。格兰特还建议阅读公司每季度写给股东的信： 这是 "网络上最好、最睿智的金融市场评论"。 My heartfelt thanks to all of you, 我衷心感谢你们所有人、 Frank K. Martin, CFA Lane K. Miller